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ABSTRACT 
 
The federal government’s entry into regulating the US housing sector began with reforms 
initiated during the New Deal. Given the effects of the Great Depression, the New Deal was the 
perfect opportunity to implement housing policies that would have ensured a more equitable 
distribution of housing to all households, especially those which are on the lower end of the 
income distribution. However, as we shall see, federal housing policy has historically followed a 
path that focuses purely on demand-side measures. This is not by accident; the housing sector 
has long been seen as a macro-stabilizer that can be used to stimulate long-term growth in the 
economy through capital formation and employment created by the construction sector, 
specifically the residential construction sector. While demand-side measures are a Keynesian 
prescription for full employment, the lack of counter-balancing supply-side measures prevents 
the housing sector from achieving an equilibrium between supply and demand in both the short 
and long term, meaning that effective demand is never fully met. The reason for this is primarily 
the way in which the housing market functions; supply is relatively price inelastic compared to 
demand in the short run and more elastic overall in the long run. Supply is also restricted by 
external factors such as land use regulation. By imposing demand-side measures in a supply-
restricted market, the eventual rise in prices will tend to price out households on the lower end 
of the income spectrum. What results is both imminent homelessness and eventual homelessness 
as a result of economic rather than noneconomic conditions, which do not have supportive 
assistance on the homelessness policy side. This paper concludes with a proposal on how the 
gaps in housing policy and homelessness policy can be remedied through an increase in public 
housing stock combined with the Housing First1 approach; an approach that does not involve 
means testing and extends access to housing without the fulfillment of any prerequisite 
conditions. 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 The “Housing First” model is a homelessness relief program that is designed to serve the immediate housing 
needs of the homeless by providing “immediate access to permanent supportive housing to individuals who are 
homeless and who have mental health and addiction problems” (Pathways Housing First 2018) 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Homelessness in the United States is a systemic national socioeconomic problem. Although it is 
now widely accepted as a highly relevant topic of social research, its importance was not 
highlighted until the 80s and 90s when it became more evident that homelessness was not only 
being caused by social factors but more so too by economic ones. Homelessness resulting from 
economic factors, such as the lack of adequate employment at a living wage or the lack of 
affordable housing, manifests more amongst low-income, poor, and extremely poor households. 
 
However in spite of this growing phenomenon across the United States, the federal policy 
response has only been sufficient enough to offer a palliative cure for this chronic ailment; 
focusing on welfare schemes such as rental assistance and housing vouchers to induce the 
affordability of private housing among low-income households rather than offering more robust 
fiscal policies such as more efficient federal spending on the expansion of the national stock of 
public housing needed to meet the effective demand for housing. The inadequate level of 
affordable housing is often cited within non-profit and academic research literature as being the 
main source of homelessness and indeed there is reason to believe so in a national housing 
market where the supply of housing stock is dominated by the private sector that favors 
homeownership over renting. The high price-elastic demand and the relatively price-inelastic 
supply of the housing stock together lead to an asymmetric national housing market that 
effectively remains in disequilibrium in the long run.  
 
This thesis first aims to show that this asymmetry is, to a large extent, precipitated by the 
overrepresentation of homeownership as the ultimate objective of key federal housing policies 
such as the National Housing Act of 1934, established under the New Deal during the Great 
Depression, and how such legislation has shaped the asymmetrical housing market by 
establishing itself on Keynesian-style demand-side principles with no counterbalance on supply-
side fiscal measures.  
 
The second aim is to show that the housing market disequilibrium, which is exacerbated by the 
presence of specific demand shocks, predisposes a larger proportion of moderate to low-income 
households on the verge of homelessness to become homeless, especially when there is growing 
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evidence of a decline in investment by both the public and private sector in affordable housing. 
These households which are on the verge of homelessness, also known as the “near” or 
imminently homeless, are a subset within the homeless community who are forced to ‘double-
up’ in temporary places of accommodation until they can afford private and more permanent 
housing options. What makes their lack of access to housing a more pressing matter and an area 
of focus in this thesis is the fact that the imminently homeless have little or no access to the 
federal welfare and support programs that the physically homeless do, simply because there are 
no protective structures or policies in place to monitor and preemptively prevent those at risk 
from entering a state of homelessness. Thus when faced with a demand-shock such as a spike in 
rents or a decline in incomes, their level of affordability for housing weakens to the point that it 
causes them to shift to a state of temporary homelessness, thereby necessitating a higher and 
most likely inefficient level of spending on homelessness programs.  
 
The third and final aim of this thesis is to put forward a theoretical foundation for future 
remedial measures aimed at mitigating the effects of ‘near’ homelessness. The proposed 
framework would follow the Housing First model, whereby more public housing units would be 
distributed to those who are at risk of being recurrently made transiently homeless. The success 
of this approach is theoretically based on the notion that the expansion of the housing stock 
would mitigate the deficiency of the housing market on the supply side while generating 
affordable housing for those who need more dependable sources of shelter when they are at risk 
of being displaced. 
 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Federal Housing Policy: Origin and Brief Overview of its Evolution 
The history of federal housing policy in the United States indicates that prior to the 1930s when 
the Great Depression brought about large-scale sweeping changes through the ‘New Deal,’ here 
was no significant participation by the federal government in the housing sector. However when 
we observe the set of federal housing policies in effect most of them follow a common theme; to 
singularly aid the expansion of homeownership. There is a dominance of the demand-side 
approach over federal policies, which govern the current-day housing sector that can find their 
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origins rooted in federal housing policy reforms established under the New Deal. The series of 
federal regulatory changes in housing policy that would form the basis for how the private 
housing sector functions today, began with the National Housing Act of 1934, which was based 
on short term pump-priming demand side theory, seen at the time by New Deal policy makers as 
the need of the hour. Much of the related literature surrounding New Deal- era housing policy 
changes indicate that they effectively converted housing real estate from a consumption good, 
whose acquisition was dependent on individual preferences, to a widely demanded investment 
good through policies facilitating homeownership by reducing the uncertainty of mortgage 
lending institutions and increasing their liquidity to finance more spending on owner-occupied 
housing (Kollmann and Fishback 2011; Gordon 2005; Carrozzo 2008; Nier 1999).  
 
The advent of legislation such as the National Housing Act of 1934, as well as other federal 
policies undertaken in the housing sector following the New Deal, worked on actively 
promoting homeownership and supporting its spread into suburban rather than urban areas 
where housing investment was more easily financed by private lending institutions (Gordon 
2005; Carrozzo 2008; Nier 1999). The reviewed literature, which spans a variety of subject 
categories other than macroeconomics, including sociology, law, and urban theory, collectively 
indicate that this new and unprecedented federal bias towards home-ownership has resulted in a 
rising level of inadequacy and under-development in the stock of housing, especially public 
housing. Additionally the modes of fiscal support offered to moderate to low-income 
households are not sufficient enough to ensure that all those who require affordable and 
adequate housing receive it (Dolbeare 1992; Landis and McClure 2010; von Hoffman 1996; 
Wood 1934; Shlay 2006 and and Mills 1987)  
 
The contributions by Gordon (2005), Carrozzo (2008) and Nier (1999) outline the history of the 
National Housing Act of 1934 and some of the preceding legislation used to describe how it 
came into existence. Wheelock’s (2008) paper provides additional descriptive detail to the 
structural aspects of the Act, to better outline how it worked. Carliner’s (1998) paper provides 
key insights into the three areas into which federal policy has expanded following its landmark 
entry into housing sector regulation. The emphasis on tax reforms that spur homeownership is a 
topic that adds weight to the argument that there is strong bias in federal policy toward 
homeownership and this is supported by the works of both Carliner (1998) and Poterba (1994). 
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Furthermore the works of Schwartz (2006), Goodman and Mayer (2018), Shlay (2006), 
Hoffman (1996) and Lang and Sohmer (2000) all contribute to the conclusion that towards the 
80s and 90s the primary remedial measure adopted to improve the distribution of affordable 
housing for low-income and poor households was merely the promotion of a higher level of 
affordability of housing by such groups, extending fiscal benefits to the suppliers of low-income 
housing and further extending government support to lending institutions to enable them to lend 
more freely to moderate and low-income households. The stock of public housing that had been 
in existence since the early 1900s has not been replaced at the rate that it has been retired and 
the authors propose that this is reducing the access to affordable housing by low-income 
households. 
 
Macro Theory and Macrodynamics of the Housing Sector 
The related academic literature of the macroeconomics underlying the private housing market 
points out that there is a general asymmetry between demand and supply in the national housing 
market in the United States (Goodman 2005; Riddel 2004; Glaeser and Gyourko 2005). The 
imbalance between supply and demand for housing is a function of both the prices and quantity 
of housing in the private market; in the short-run achievement of housing market equilibrium is 
inhibited due to the price-based rigidity of the supply curve while in the long run it is postulated 
that equilibrium is eventually achieved between house prices and macroeconomic variables 
(White and Taltavull de La Paz 2015). The general consensus is that the long-run equilibrium in 
the housing market is achieved only if the supply curve gains more flexibility in the long run.  
 
With a relatively inflexible long run supply and a more volatile short-run demand, it is almost 
always likely that in the short run restrictions in supply will force some proportion of low-
income families and individuals into homelessness, especially when the subsidies or rental 
assistance they receive at the federal or state level is not sufficient to meet market norms (The 
Institute for Children, Poverty and Homelessness [ICPH] 2015). It is therefore understood from 
the existing literature and research that, as a result, the effective national demand for housing 
may never be met by the requisite supply needed to bring the private housing market to a true 
long-run equilibrium that is indicative of full provision.  
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Thus, a section of society that needs to consume housing as shelter and not as a consumer 
commodity is always left unable to do so because they are ‘priced out’ of the private housing 
market by their inability to afford the prevalent market prices for housing.  
 
This pricing out mechanism is a function of various macroeconomic factors, including a rise in 
unemployment leading to income shocks and an inadequate supply of affordable private housing 
owing to rental shocks, and is more prevalent in central urban areas. It is interesting to note that 
O’Flaherty, in his April 2009 paper, points out that while rental shocks act as a strong 
precipitator for homelessness, income shocks have a stronger impact on it amongst the poor 
(O’Flaherty 2009). As this thesis will go on to present, addressing the lack of affordable housing 
as a first step could potentially reduce the homelessness of individuals and families that are 
increasingly being excluded from accessing housing in the private housing market (United 
States Interagency Council on Homelessness 2017; [ICPH] 2015; Goodman 2005). 
 
Policies that allocate federal funding for housing attempt only to increase the affordability of 
private housing for low income or extremely low income groups. However these measures do 
not mitigate the inefficiencies of an imperfect housing market and do so even less if the support 
being offered is constantly subject to fluctuation ([ICPH] 2015; Landis and McClure 2010; 
Dolbeare 1992). Even with the obvious importance that is exhibited in the literature on 
macroeconomy and housing and its potential impact on homelessness there is still a gap in the 
macroeconomic research that relates macroeconomic theory to housing market research (Leung 
2004).  
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The focus of the federal government on targeting the ‘clearing’ of housing demand through the 
private sector is based on the inherent understanding that housing and especially investment in 
housing real estate has the capacity to influence the direction of the national economy; this 
influence can serve as an especially important tool during times of financial crisis. The papers 
by Abramovitz (1964) and Leamer (2007) refer to the operation of the housing sector over the 
long cycle and how this makes housing an important macro stabilizer. This fact is perhaps the 
source of the focus of federal policy on homeownership and forms an important part of the 
discussion concerning the change in housing policy approach that needs to be adopted to 
improve the provision of affordable housing.  
 
The use of policy measures that target the affordability of housing is aimed at enabling 
households to be better predisposed to accommodate price fluctuations in the housing market. 
However the literature examined cites several external factors that impact short run housing 
demand and supply that are not price related. Mishkin (2008), Riddel (2004), Green, Malpezzi 
and Mayo (2005), Malpezzi and Vandell (2002) and Leamer (2007) all highlight how 
downwardly inflexible housing prices and rising construction costs in combination with other 
non-price related factors reinforce the imbalance between supply and demand for housing, 
further necessitating direct intervention by the federal government to bridge the resulting short-
run supply gap. 
 
The ‘affordability gap,’ as explained by Quigley and Raphael (1994), is not fully mitigated by 
the federal government’s existing set of affordability enhancing policies. The latter is evident 
from the works of Fischer and Sard (2017), Malpezzi and Vandell (2002) and O’ Flaherty 
(2011). The use of low income Housing Tax Credits to boost private investment in affordable 
housing has little impact on expanding housing stock, while government expenditures on rental 
assistance programs are often insufficient to meet the needs of low-income households, adding 
to their rental burden as housing prices and rents increase. In addition, the declining stock of 
public housing puts an added strain on the supply of affordable housing. The literature indicates 
that even with the insufficient level of spending on rental assistance programs, the federal 
government is reluctant to enhance or even restore its inventory of public housing stock to 
support the growing need for affordable housing.  
 
 9 
The literature reviewed thus far implies that government policy concerning housing and its 
distribution has lost sight of the dual nature of housing demand; it is consumed both for its 
necessity2 as a dependable and stable form of shelter as well as for its use as an investment asset 
that serves as an additional source of wealth for most households that buy a home. For those 
who consume it solely as a dependable and stable form of shelter, there are not enough 
protective measures to ensure that they have access to adequate housing or support when the 
affordability gap widens enough to render them homeless. 
 
The works of Dolbeare (1992), Elliot and Krivo (1991), O’ Flaherty (2009) collectively serve to 
present whom the affordability gap makes most susceptible to homelessness, also known as the 
imminently homeless as described earlier. Examining the existing methodologies used by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to measure and monitor homelessness 
reveals a gap in the development of methods to track these imminently homeless, even though 
the awareness of their existence is documented in an ad-hoc survey conducted in 2013 by HUD. 
Collinson, Ellen and Ludwig (2015) further emphasize how federal housing policy initiatives 
directed at bridging the affordability gap fail to do so. Benjaminsen and Andrade (2015) and 
Rolnik (2013) highlight that the liberal welfare system of the United States and the neoliberally 
inclined facilitation of the financialization of housing in the United States are indicative of a 
lack of political exigency in resolutely addressing the inadequacy of affordable housing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
2 A necessity good can be considered to be one that possesses a price elasticity of demand that is relatively 
inelastic, meaning that when its prices rise the quantity consumed declines very little in comparison. On the 
contrary a luxury good is one whose consumption is more dispensable and much more elastic; the quantities 
consumed drop sharply with small increases in price (Kemp 1998, 592). In this regard housing could be viewed as a 
necessity and a luxury. The transition from one to other is dependent on the purpose for which a form of housing is 
consumed. Owner-occupied housing tends to espouse a sort of ‘luxury’ good in that if user costs rise too high, there 
is always the option of ‘trading down’ (Carliner 1998, 302) to a smaller unit or renting  
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Any possible solution to the housing inadequacy problem would have to follow a path that 
ensures that access to adequate housing is a human right that must be upheld for all. This would 
entail viewing housing as more than just an investment vehicle or as a macro-stabilizer, but as a 
necessity. A possible framework for future remedial policy measures that uphold housing as a 
human right lies within the Housing First model, which as described by Atherton and Nicholls 
(2008), is already in use within the United States to counter homelessness resulting from non-
economic factors. The Housing First model would have to be coupled with an expansion of the 
public housing stock to successfully accommodate the model’s implementation. 
 
 
III. THE NEW DEAL AND HOUSING POLICY  
 
The pathway to identifying gaps in the provisioning of adequate and affordable housing to low 
and moderate income households (especially those at risk of being temporarily displaced into 
homelessness by income or rent shocks) begins by understanding how the modern-day 
functioning of the US housing sector came into being. Much of how the housing sector 
functions today in relation to the supply of and demand for either owner-occupied or rental 
housing depends on the framework of federal policies that have come to govern them. The 
foundation for this framework was originally laid through the landmark policy changes 
introduced by the Roosevelt administration under the New Deal; the need of the hour during the 
Great Depression was to promote employment creation and the rescue of a fast sinking financial 
sector. Prior to the New Deal the federal government had little involvement in the housing 
sector. When the Great Depression began, federal intervention was necessary to stem the 
widespread level of foreclosures in the agricultural mortgage sector and to help the economic 
recovery gain momentum by supporting the housing sector and thus generate employment and 
investment in the private sector. However as we shall see in this chapter, the approach that has 
consistently been used by the federal government concerning housing policy has been one that 
is almost entirely ‘hands-off’ — attempting to achieve the growth rate required to bring the 
economy out of a recession by stimulating the private housing sector through the mortgage 
lending market, while extending as little direct federal intervention as necessary, to ensure that 
the condition of fiscal conservatism is not compromised. This meant minimizing direct federal 
spending, emphasizing benefits created by tax deductions and subsidies that boost the supply of 
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and demand for owner-occupied housing. The objective was to maximize the level of 
investment in residential construction (primarily of owner occupied units but also later on, as we 
shall see below, of low-income rental housing) consistent with macro stability. In a subsequent 
chapter we will see how the housing sector has regularly been referred to as a source of macro 
stability and that this sourcing is more prevalent in times of economic crisis (either housing 
related or otherwise).  
 
However, this chapter goes on to describe further some of the foundational policies described 
above and how they have placed the focus solely on promoting homeownership. Federal 
housing policy to ensure that every American has the right to access a decent home has 
therefore only ever concentrated on achieving this goal through homeownership without 
attempting to understand whether homeownership is the best approach to securing dependable 
and medium to long term shelter for households across all income groups, let alone determining 
whether it is the most appropriate wealth accumulation strategy for all income groups. We will 
examine the first measure of the Roosevelt administration: the National Housing Act of 1934 
and how it changed the focus of homeownership in the postwar era. This chapter will also 
examine the relation of fiscal policy objectives to housing, such as tax reforms and subsidy 
programs further targeting the promotion of homeownership and its extension to ownership for 
low-income households. The chapter concludes by briefly contrasting home-ownership-oriented 
federal policies with other programs, such as federal rental assistance subsidies and public 
housing, to highlight the bias towards homeownership, and assessing whether this is the best 
approach to provide sustainable housing opportunities to low and moderate income households 
in the long run. 
 
The Great Depression and The New Deal: The First Federal Housing Policies 
Prior to 1934 and the efforts to counter the Great Depression, housing was not part of the federal 
government’s policy agenda; during that time period the construction, finance and the purchase 
of residential real estate were purely private decisions. The federal government exercised only a 
minimal level of intervention in housing-related regulations, restricting its role to the 
management of slum areas in large cities toward the end of 19 century, directing government 
credit towards agricultural lending, and to the construction of housing for war workers during 
World War I (Nier 1999, 619 and Gotham 2000, 305). Government policy was to allow the 
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market to function ‘freely’ under a liberal laissez-faire approach to meet the collective housing 
needs of the national economy.  
 
The onset of the Great Depression of 1929 brought a drastic turnaround to the federal 
government’s approach toward housing policy in the United States. In the late 1920s and early 
30s the US economy was faced with a mortgage crisis on an unprecedented scale and level. 
During World War I, construction of new single family and multifamily housing units was 
temporarily interrupted, but began to pick up pace rapidly in the late 20s to reach an all-time 30 
year high by 1927, going from just under 200,000 new single-family starts valued at close to $2 
Billion to around 600,000 new single family starts valued at 5 Bn USD during that five to six 
year period (Wheelock 2008, 135).  
 
The boom in housing construction during this period was naturally accompanied by an increase 
in the demand for short-term mortgages (Carrozzo 2008, 7). However the structure of short-term 
mortgages prevalent at the time varied significantly from the mortgage structures we are 
familiar with today. The majority of short term mortgages were structured on a repayment 
horizon of five to ten years. Most housing mortgages at the time were structured in a way that 
only necessitated the regular payment of interest at annual rates of not less than 8 percent, with 
the entire value of the principle due as a final ‘balloon’ payment upon maturity of the loan. Most 
homeowners, unable to afford the large one time repayment of principal due upon maturity, 
would have to default or attempt to refinance the same loan for another five to ten year period 
upon maturity (Carrozzo 2008, 6).  
 
Thus, as the stock of short-term mortgages increased, so did the need to ‘roll-over’ mortgage 
debt. However the rapid increase in house prices led to a construction boom, as lenders got 
caught up in the euphoria of a bullish housing market. Mortgage lenders believed they could 
afford the risks associated with the increased need to roll over because the value of the 
underlying collateral was appreciating significantly and because the stock market provided easy 
financing for new construction. Eventually, the growth in housing investment far exceeded its 
real demand and signaled the beginning of a highly (and dangerously) speculative period in the 
housing market. To curb the widespread level of speculative activity, especially in the stock 
market, the Federal Reserve began to adopt tighter monetary policy in 1928 by raising interest 
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rates, putting a squeeze on housing investment (Wheelock 2008, 135). The decline in 
investment in housing construction precipitated a drop in house prices, with the rate of this 
decline increasing rapidly as the Depression began to set in; between 1928 and 1933 residential 
property construction declined by 95 percent and home-repair expenditures dropped by 90 
percent (Nier 1999, 620).  
 
 The continued roll over of outstanding debt caused outstanding home mortgage debt to increase 
throughout the 1920s and into the 30s, even after the decline and leveling-off of house prices. 
While the nominal value of mortgage debt peaked in 1930 and subsequently declined, “deflation 
caused the real value of outstanding mortgage debt to continue to rise until 1932” (Wheelock 
2008, 137), greatly increasing the burden of outstanding mortgage debt during the contraction 
phase of the Depression (Wheelock 2008, 135). This rising debt burden and the declining value 
of their collateral security led lenders to hold back on both the creation of new mortgages and 
the refinancing of existing ones (Carrozzo 2008, 7). 
 
The drastic rise in unemployment also spurred a sudden rise in the public’s demand for 
immediate liquidity leading to mass withdrawals of savings deposits. This deposit drain imposed 
a liquidity crunch upon banks heavily invested in mortgages that could no longer be repaid as 
they became due, which when combined with the reduction in mortgage refinancing, created an 
acute shortage of funds in the mortgage lending market (Carrozzo 2008, 6). 
 
The Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 represents the immediate federal policy response to the 
collapsing mortgage system and housing market of the Great Depression and forms the basis for 
the National Housing Act of 1934, the federal housing policy that will subsequently be 
examined to show how owner-occupied housing became the objective of future federal housing 
policies and programs. A quick overview of the Home Owners Loan Act (HOLA) and the Home 
Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) that was established under it will therefore offer a more in-
depth understanding of the structure of the National Housing Act of 1934.  
 
The Home Owner’s Loan Act, first proposed by the Roosevelt administration on April the 13 
1933 and approved by Congress on June the 13 of the same year, was established to help 
provide debt relief to the owners of homes who were unable to restructure their “balloon” 
 14 
mortgage loans (Carrozzo 2008, 8). The Act provided for the establishment of the Home 
Owners Loan Corporation, which was created as an agency of the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board with an initial capitalization of $200 Million funded by the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation and authorized for a period of three years from inception to ‘purchase and refinance 
delinquent home mortgages’ (Wheelock 2008, 141). With the activities of the HOLC, the 
federal government was keen not to repeat the mistakes it had encountered in the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Act of 1932 (FHLB), established under the Hoover Administration. The FHLB was 
originally established under the mandate of providing subsidies to reduce the construction costs 
of housing and supporting private home building by directly originating long-term amortized 
mortgages at low interest rates through a system of federal home loan banks (Gotham 2000, 
305). Unfortunately the initiative was founded on an extremely risk averse view of loan 
origination, and ultimately led to only three known loans being originated under the program 
(Carrozzo 2008, 9).  
 
The HOLC eventually replaced the loan origination role under the FHLB with one that 
restructured qualifying balloon mortgages into self-amortizing loans, at an interest rate of not 
more than five percent, spread over a 15 to 30 year maturity period (Gotham 2000, 305 and 
Wheelock 2008, 142). The HOLC was also authorized to issue bonds up to an initial total value 
of $2 Billion (later increased to $4.75 Billion) to finance the purchase of either defaulting 
mortgages or mortgages that had foreclosed within the previous 24 months from the portfolios 
of banks that held such delinquent mortgages. The mortgages had to have a value lower than 
$14,000 or 80 percent of the total appraised value and had to be issued on 1-to-4-family 
properties (Wheelock 2008, 141 and Carrozzo 2008, 9). Interest earned on the HOLC-issued 
bonds was set at a maximum of four percent, federally guaranteed and exempt from federal, 
state, and local taxes. The bonds had a maturity of 18 years (Carrozzo 2008, 8).  
 
The HOLC also established a more standardized method of appraisal of properties throughout 
the United States, in an effort to more accurately assess the risks on mortgage loans being 
purchased and restructured. The appraisal system that was put in place however was a color-
coded rating system that identified desirable neighborhoods where investment and appreciation 
of property values were more likely. These neighborhoods were predominantly White suburban 
areas and coded green, with the worst-off neighborhoods being completely or even partially 
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Black urban ones, coded red. While there is significant evidence that shows that the HOLC 
provided unbiased mortgage assistance to the areas most in need, the areas that were moderate 
to high risk as classified under the appraisal system (yellow to red respectively) and the 
encouragement of the appraisal system’s extensive use as a model for risk assessment by private 
credit institutions, ultimately led to the form of lender discrimination that strongly prevailed 
well into the late 60s and is more commonly referred to as ‘redlining’ (Carrozzo 2008, 18 and 
Nier 1999, 623- 624).  
 
The aspect of the HOLC’s role that is most relevant to this discussion is that of assisting 
mortgage lenders in achieving a higher level of liquidity that ensured the continued availability 
of funding for future mortgages. As was discussed during the drafting of the HOLC bill, the 
conceptual approach towards achieving this higher level of liquidity was through the conversion 
of relatively illiquid long-term mortgage assets on lenders’ balance sheets into ‘highly 
marketable’ HOLC issued securities that would potentially be traded by other financial 
institutions for cash. This source of external financing, facilitated by the HOLC, would enable 
private lenders to access continuously the liquidity they required to continue originating 
mortgage loans with only a minimal level of intervention by the federal government. While the 
idea of a ‘highly marketable security’ was proposed during the draft phase of the bill, the 
execution of the infrastructure needed to increase the marketability of HOLC-related securities, 
indeed to even generate a secondary market for them, did not arise until the implementation of 
the National Housing Act of 1934. To achieve the most crucial objective of stabilizing the 
sinking national mortgage lending market, lawmakers felt that the framework for long-term and 
steady amortization, as achieved through the HOLC’s activities, would increase stability in 
mortgage lending and make them more attractive investments for financial institutions in the 
long run because it encouraged ‘unencumbered’ home ownership to borrowers of mortgage 
loans over a much longer repayment horizon than had previously existed (Carrozzo 2008, 12).  
 
The hallmark of New Deal housing policy reform is the transition in views on homeownership; 
from one where it would be the eventual fulfillment of the distant dream of financial security, to 
one that homeownership can and should be part of every individual’s long-term aspirations for 
stability and growth. Of course this transition in views would not have existed without the 
government’s newfound interventionist approach towards the housing sector of ensuring that 
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there was long-term stability in homeownership and that the uncertainties of past experiences 
associated with it were being eliminated through federal-level policy change.  
 
However the government was not primarily motivated by a need to ensure the housing security 
of the American people, but rather to prevent the fragility of financial structures experienced 
during the Great Depression. To strengthen the mortgage-lending market, and indirectly 
influence residential construction, measures had to be taken to eliminate the possibility of 
illiquidity as seen at the beginning of the Great Depression. Therefore, to ensure that there was a 
stable and growing market where mortgage lenders could obtain the financial liquidity required 
to continue issuing new mortgage debt, the government decided to create a secondary market 
that would ensure the marketability of the fledgling asset-backed securities created by the 
HOLC. The institutional structures, as envisaged during the inception of the HOLA and that 
formed the basis for this secondary market, were established through the National Housing Act 
of 1934. 
 
The National Housing Act of 1934 was drafted to provide a permanent remedy to the flawed 
mortgage lending system; the HOLC was merely a temporary ‘band-aid’ to treat the emergency 
situation at hand and was not implemented with the view of being a permanent solution. While 
the federal government’s aim was to stimulate housing construction, it wanted to achieve this 
without any significant additional outlay of government spending. The drafters of the National 
Housing Act sought instead to direct private enterprise toward driving residential construction 
by providing more favorable conditions for home financing by replacing the then prevalent 
approach of mortgage refinancing with self-amortizing longer-term lending (Carrozzo 2008, 
24). The basic framework of the National Housing Act was expanded from the existing policy 
framework of the HOLC, with some significant additions. The aims of the National Housing 
Act of 1934 can be distilled into four categories.  
 
Firstly, it sought further to establish a stable mortgage instrument based on conditions similar to 
the restructuring conditions of the HOLC: amortized mortgages that could gradually be repaid 
from monthly incomes in full over much longer periods thereby offering continued stability in 
homeownership to borrowers.  
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Secondly, it sought to continue to increase the stability of mortgage investments for lenders 
through the establishment of a federal mortgage insurance program on qualifying mortgage 
loans issued either 1) for the purchase or improvements to existing single family units and rental 
projects (multifamily units) or 2) for the construction of new ones. The mortgage insurance 
program was to be administered by an agency specially established for this purpose, called the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA). The FHA would insure mortgages that only met certain 
criteria such as amortization, a maximum interest rate of 5 percent and a maximum loan value of 
$16,000 (Wheelock 2008). Other qualifying criteria included a maximum loan to value ratio of 
80 percent, which was subsequently raised via amendments to the Act passed in 1937 to 90 
percent on mortgages to new homes of a maximum value of $5,400 in an effort to stimulate 
homeownership among middle- to low- income households.  
 
Prior to the establishment of the FHA the minimum downpayment required by private lenders 
on new mortgages was 30 percent of the property value, thus the changes proposed in the NHA 
significantly improved the accessibility of housing finance (Nier 1999). The mortgage insurance 
program, like other insurance schemes, collected an annual premium of between 0.5 and 1 
percent of the outstanding principal on the loan (Wheelock 2008). Since the premium collected 
would form the pool from which indemnifications would be made the costs to taxpayers would 
be minimal, fitting well with the Roosevelt administration’s plans to keep fiscal spending 
associated with the policy at a minimum. The risk underwriting of loans that were to be insured 
however would continue to follow the racially discriminative method of property appraisal 
established under the HOLC.  
 
The insurance program guaranteed that in the event of a foreclosure due to default, the 
foreclosing property would be transferred to the FHA and the mortgage lender would receive 
debentures bearing an interest of three percent and a maturity of three years beyond the 
mortgage maturity in exchange. The FHA would then proceed to sell the property and if the sale 
occurred before the maturity of the mortgage the debentures would be redeemed (Carrozzo 
2008, 39). Thus, the process of indemnification under the insurance program came with the 
added bonus of liquidation of the underlying property asset being undertaken by a third-party 
government enterprise. In this way lenders would be more secure in their capacity to expand 
mortgage investments. 
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Thirdly, since the Act was being pursued to stimulate building it was formulated to alleviate the 
problems of large-scale unemployment that existed in building-related trades. The loans insured 
by the FHA also covered loans extended for the repair, expansion, and alteration of existing 
homes to create additional employment in building trades (Carrozzo 2008). 
 
Lastly, but most importantly, the Act sought to completely reform the American mortgage 
system itself by creating liquidity to private lenders to expand mortgage lending. The National 
Housing Act of 1934 incorporated provisions for the creation of private ‘national mortgage 
associations’ which were essentially ‘private mortgage lending institutions’ that would engage 
in the purchase and sale of financial instruments backed by pools of these new and more 
‘secure’ mortgages. These mortgage associations would then purchase insured mortgage loans 
outright from local lenders at a favorable price thus releasing new funds to local lenders for 
investment. Surprisingly however, even with the federal mandate for provisions made to 
facilitate their creation incorporated in the NHA, private mortgage associations did not 
materialize given that lenders were still skeptical about mortgage markets. Following several 
years of inaction the federal government, through amendments introduced in 1937 to the 1934 
Housing Act, itself established a national mortgage association, named the Federal National 
Mortgage Association, or Fannie Mae for short, as an extension of the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation.  
 
This new entity would provide a national market for mortgages and would be able to distribute 
insured mortgages from areas with a surplus of funds to ones with a deficit. Furthermore, it 
sought to issue debt instruments against a packaged ‘pool’ of insured and secure mortgages 
(assets) that could be freely bought and sold on the open market to generate funds that could be 
used to purchase more newly issued FHA mortgage loans (Carrozzo 2008, 42-43 and Wheelock 
2008, 145). This self-perpetuating mode of financing the purchase and issuance of new FHA 
insured mortgages satisfied the federal government’s objective of limiting expenditure and 
secured Congressional support for the new legislation by maintaining a balanced budget and 
supporting private enterprise.  
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The success of New Deal housing policy can be seen in the results: the number of housing starts 
and sales grew from 332,000 units in 1936 to 619,000 in 1941, the national mortgage 
foreclosure rate dropped from 250,000 nonfarm units in 1932 to 18,000 in 1951 and by the end 
of 1972, the FHA had assisted 11,000,000 families in purchasing new homes and another 22 
Million families in making home improvements (Nier 1999, 625).  
 
The bias toward homeownership has remained largely the basis for any subsequent housing 
policy reforms undertaken since the 1930s. An indication of this bias towards owner-occupied 
housing is the level of federal funding that is directed towards homeowners versus renters; in 
2008 the federal government spent $6 on assistance to homeowners for every dollar spent on 
assistance to low-income renters (Landis and McClure 2010, 320). This difference in funding is 
not based on the fact that the needs of owner-occupied housing may be higher than those of 
renters; income from homeowners’ imputed rent in the same year was recorded as $ 59,886 
compared with $28,921, but the percentage of income spent on housing-related expenses was 
only 20 percent for homeowners versus 30 percent for renters (Landis and McClure 2010, 343).  
 
Housing Policies Following the New Deal 
Federal involvement in housing policy over the years since the 1930s has been in three main 
areas: the regulation of and influence over the mortgage market, tax policy associated with 
housing and the provision of direct subsidies to housing producers and consumers (Carliner 
1998, 300). Policies and programs based on the first two approaches are used at times when it is 
necessary for the federal government to provide a macroeconomic stimulus to boost investment 
via the residential construction sector, while direct subsidies and public housing are offered as 
assistance to improve affordability of rental housing to low-income families and have usually 
taken up the least space in the set of policies targeting homeownership. The first area of federal 
involvement has already been covered. The rest of this chapter will cover tax and subsidy 
policies and the influence they have on the housing sector. 
 
Tax subsidies in the form of deductions of home mortgage interest and property taxes from 
reported income are the largest form of federal assistance associated with the housing sector; 
federal expenditure on housing assistance was less than $32.9 billion in 2004 whereas tax 
benefits including mortgage interest deductions exceeded $100 billion in the same year 
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(Schwartz 2006, 5). The federal housing policy interventions, drafted during the Great 
Depression, did not include tax reform since the purpose of their implementation was to offer a 
quick remedial solution to the failing mortgage market with as little government expenditure as 
possible.  
 
The importance of the tax deductions on home mortgage interest and property taxes became first 
apparent during the large-scale tax reforms of the Reagan era in the mid to late 1980s. The Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 introduced a distinction between the interest paid on home mortgages and 
other forms of consumer interest. The former along with property tax were retained as 
deductions on personal income in the Act while other nonmortgage consumer interest and some 
state and local taxes were removed as deductions. The 1986 Tax Reform also eliminated the 
enhanced provisions, introduced earlier in the 1981 Economic Recovery Act, which made 
investment in rental housing more lucrative. Aside from these deductions the exclusion of 
imputed rents of homeowners from taxable income also constitutes a considerable form of tax 
subsidy that implicitly supports homeownership. Imputed rents are considered as the rents that 
homeowners are implicitly receiving from being their own landlords. In theory this is income in 
kind for homeowners that should be taxed but is considered equivalent to any other noncash 
implicit income that is not subject to income tax, such as the value of food consumed by farmers 
that they have cultivated themselves (Carliner 1998, 301−2).  
 
Other forms of tax subsidies that homeowners benefit from include: 1) a tax subsidy introduced 
in 1951 that enables the rollover (Carliner 1998, 302) of capital gains from the sale of one home 
while buying another one of equal or greater value (trading up), 2) the provision in the Revenue 
Act of 1964 that enabled a one-time tax exemption from capital gains on sales for owners of age 
55 or older who choose to purchase a smaller home or rent instead and 3) the Tax Payer Relief 
Act of 1997, which replaced the roll-over of capital gains tax and the exemption of taxation on 
capital gains of homeowners above 55 years of up to $125,000 with a much higher exemption 
threshold of $500,000 available to homeowners of any age filing joint returns under family 
status. The latter both incentivized homeownership and disincentivized the decision to rent or 
trade down instead (Carliner 1998, 302). These policies were enacted in response to the notion 
that the rollover provision had led to an over investment in suburban real estate and the 
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simultaneous decline in development of urban areas (Carliner 1998, 302). These incentives have 
all had a dominant influence on driving the federal agenda of increasing homeownership.  
 
The spectrum of federal incentives that influence investment in rental housing (and thus the 
supply of housing for moderate to low-income households) appears to be quite limited in 
comparison to that of homeownership. The two most prominent forms of tax subsidies available 
to investors in rental housing are tax credits for investment in low-income housing and projects 
that aid the rehabilitation and revitalization of historic areas and low interest mortgages 
subsidized through state and local governments through revenues from the issuance of mortgage 
revenue bonds and mortgage revenue certificates that are tax exempt (Carliner 1998, 303 and 
Schwartz 2006, 5).  
 
The tax benefits accruing to home owners are a direct function of the parameters that govern 
each individual homeowner’s ‘after-tax user cost of homeownership3,’such as the nominal 
interest rate, the property tax rate, the depreciation rate of property and the household’s 
marginal federal income tax rate, and is therefore easily determined. The tax benefits accruing 
to rental housing however are not as easily determined; tax subsidies to rental housing depend 
on the tax rates applicable to the “marginal rental landlord,” whose tax parameters in turn 
determine the rental rate that prevails in the market. Depending on the characteristics assumed 
for the “marginal rental landlord,” these tax parameters and thus the tax subsidies that accrue to 
them vary greatly because the tax rate differs depending on the characteristics chosen for the 
marginal rental landlord. This in turn impacts the user costs that the ‘marginal rental landlord’ 
faces (Poterba 1994, 246 −47).  
 
Take, for example, the case of a marginal rental landlord assumed to be a “top-bracket 
individual investor”; such an investor receives the most benefit from depreciation allowances on 
rental property, as they are entitled to a larger deduction that reduces the taxable income, 
                                                        
3 User cost in this instance is assumed to be the “marginal cost of an incremental dollar of owner-occupied housing, 
including the forgone return on the owner’s equity,” where forgone return on owner’s equity refers to imputed rents 
(Poterba 1994, 242). User cost is usually defined by the nominal interest rate, the property tax rate per dollar of 
property value, the household’s marginal federal income tax rate, depreciation rate of the property, the expected 
rate of price appreciation and the real price of owner-occupied housing (Poterba 1994, 243) Riddel 2004 refers to 
user cost as “the after-tax inflation-adjusted cost of homeownership” (Riddel 2004, 125).  Riddell identifies the user 
cost as a “non-linear function of interest rates, taxes and the expected rate of future house price appreciation. 
Quigley and Raphael (2004) also include a similar interpretation of user cost in their paper. 
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stimulating higher investment in rental real estate and thereby reducing the overall rent in the 
rental market. However if the marginal rental landlord’s characteristics place him/her in a lower 
tax bracket these deductions are also reduced and as a result the overall rents would be pushed 
up as investment in rental real estate declines (Poterba 1994, 246−47). The 1981 Economic 
Recovery Tax Act improved tax benefits to investors of rental real estate through reforms that 
considerably reduced the tax lifetime on such properties and reduced marginal tax rates, 
however the introduction of more stringent depreciation methods in the 1986 Tax Reform Act 
eliminated these tax benefits, causing real rents to rise as investors in rental real estate 
anticipated diminishing returns on their depreciation- related tax benefits (Poterba 1994, 247). 
 
Comparing and contrasting the various approaches that exist within the federal housing policies, 
it is evident that homeownership appears to be the predominant policy objective, and is used to 
indirectly guide the housing sector in this direction. However it appears to be a response to the 
need to increase investment in a sector with a dominant impact on growth and employment. As 
we have seen from the New Deal policy reforms, residential construction has historically been 
considered a part of the construction sector that is easily influenced by government policy and 
so it would be a logical choice when attempting to target a sector that could be the source for a 
countercyclical macroeconomic policy. This emphasis on residential construction as a means for 
macro-economic stimulation and the federal government’s focused attempts to provide an 
unimpeded source of liquidity to private mortgage lenders seeking higher returns on their 
mortgage lending in secondary markets, may be in direct conflict with what housing policy 
should attempt to achieve, which is to provide stable, dependable and permanent sources of 
shelter to all those who demand it.  
 
If Not Homeownership, Then What? 
What, therefore, is the recourse for those who cannot afford to own homes in an economic and 
policy environment that only seems to favor homeownership as a solution to accessing 
dependable, stable and permanent forms of shelter? The federal government’s policy solution to 
the latter question appears in the form of housing subsidy programs that ‘subsidize’ home 
ownership to those who would otherwise be unable to afford owner-occupied housing at the 
prevailing market price as result of restricted growth in incomes and access to credit facilities. 
The most widely accepted historical explanation for this inability to access mortgage financing, 
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especially amongst Black and minority groups who are most likely to face housing affordability 
issues due to restricted incomes and access to credit, stems from the racial segregation and 
discriminatory lending practices that were propagated by the NHA’s standardized property 
appraisal system. As described earlier, this system led to white suburban households gaining a 
significant comparative advantage over their black counterparts in accumulating wealth through 
homeownership, that negatively impacted financial and human capital gains amongst blacks 
over a thirty year period since the FHA was first established.  
 
The end of redlining finally came with the signing of the Fair Housing Act in 1968 that 
mandated the extension of housing opportunities to marginalized Blacks and minorities and to 
improve residential integration (Nier 1999, 630). However the Fair Housing Act merely aimed 
to make home-ownership more affordable to those who were discriminated against in the 
mortgage lending market. Once again the approach adopted was to propose below-market rate 
mortgage programs, only this time it was to racially marginalized groups. The Act failed to 
make adequate housing directly more accessible to these groups and still left a gaping hole 
where a solution was necessary to expand swiftly the access of housing to those who had missed 
opportunities for income and wealth expansion over the three decades that had passed between 
the New Deal reforms and its implementation.  
 
An example of direct intervention that took place around the same time as the implementation of 
the Fair Housing Act, that tried to improve the direct access to housing was the development of 
the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968. This came following a report by President 
Johnson’s Committee on Urban Housing (the Kaiser Committee) which stressed the urgency to 
increase production of housing units to provide for the baby boom generation’s expanding 
household size and to replace the stock of substandard housing in existence from the post WWI 
era. The formal proposal in December of 1968 did not place much emphasis on homeownership 
and for a change directed federal intervention to set a goal of producing 26 Million new or 
renovated units over the course of the next ten years. However, in pages 3957–58 of Lyndon B. 
Johnson’s recorded message of the Congressional Record of the second session of the 90 
Congress in 1968, it mentions that this federal legislature implicitly contained a proposal to 
offer low-income families the ability to buy “modest homes financed and built by the private 
sector” (quoted in Carliner [1998, 312]) by offering higher subsidies to private mortgage lenders 
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which would enable them to offer more below-market-rate mortgages to poorer individuals for 
the purchase of newly built homes or for the improvement of existing ones.  
 
Once again an opportunity for the federal government to disconnect the access to housing from 
the influence of the financial sector fell through policy cracks, even in the face of the dismal 
living conditions faced by up to 20 Million Americans at the time, housed in substandard 
housing units (Carliner 1998, 310-3 −12). Under Section 235 of the Act a first wave of 
government financing for the construction of 400,000 homes, specifically for low and moderate-
income families, took place (Carliner 1998, 310−12). Having little or no experience in lending 
into the private construction sector, the government faced heavy losses when low-income 
families who were sold sub-standard housing at above market prices began to default on loan 
payments due to the excessive cost of repairs that extended their debt beyond their means of 
repayment. The HUD had to take over units on defaulting loans while sellers and lenders 
benefited, with the burden of higher subsidies transferred to the taxpayer (Carliner 1998, 
310−12).  
 
The strong focus on home-ownership becomes more evident when key federal policies began to 
address low-income homeownership as a key federal goal in the 1980s and 90s. The attempted 
elimination in the early 70s, of discriminatory lending practices that existed through red-lining 
paved the way for community reinvestment initiatives that were ultimately federally mandated; 
mortgage lenders, specifically savings and loans institutions were expected to reinvest into the 
communities from which they received deposits. Those that failed to do so were “disinvesting” 
in these communities and eventually causing their decline by essentially taking deposits from 
these declining communities and reinvesting them elsewhere. The advocacy for community 
reinvestment initiatives to gain more prominence led to the establishment of two key federal 
policies that attempted to address the inequality that arose from the disinvestment that was 
forcing more urban areas into decline: the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 and the 
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977. The former necessitated that lenders should report 
where they extended residential lending, enabling it to be monitored to ensure that 
discriminatory practices leading to disinvestment were not taking place, while the latter made 
reinvestment a federal requirement.  
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 Low-income homeownership was not an integral part of the approach to federally mandated 
community reinvestment initiatives, however towards the turn of the 20 century it began to enter 
in as a prominent policy goal at their inception, (Shlay 2006, 515). There were a variety of 
reasons that led to this shift but the one that is most relevant to this discussion is the fact that 
low-income homebuyers were being recognized as a subset of the demand spectrum for housing 
real estate that remained “untapped”. Federal housing policy structures from the New Deal 
promoting homeownership originally targeted the section of the American population that 
constituted white suburban neighborhoods. This subset became more or less saturated as 
evidenced by the stagnation of home ownership rates towards the late 1980s and early 90s; a 
new target base for residential mortgages was needed to achieve a financial market-based 
macroeconomic stimulus.  
 
 In 1992, the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act, which was 
established to set specific ‘performance targets’ for government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) 
such as Fannie Mae, aimed to expand homeownership to a broader range of households. HUD 
also expanded its reach to low- and moderate-income households by setting targets on the 
purchase of loans made to such households in central cities. Both the Clinton and Bush 
administrations focused federal policy efforts on increasing homeownership overall by 
improving the rate of low-income homeownership (Shlay 2006, 515). In 1995, President Clinton 
proposed the National Homeownership Strategy with the intent of improving overall 
homeownership rates up to 67.5 percent. In 2003, George W. Bush signed the American Dream 
Downpayment Initiative to help first time homeowners secure a downpayment (Goodman and 
Mayer 2018).  
 
Apart from the purpose that low- and moderate-income homeowners would serve as the new 
target base needed to stimulate economic growth via the housing sector, the expansion of 
homeownership opportunities toward such households was also based on the government’s 
inherent assumption that the social benefits of homeownership would be imputed to more low-
income households by making them appear as ‘safer’ investment options to private mortgage 
lenders where they would once have been deemed too risky to extend mortgage loans to.  
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With hindsight it is clear that these policies were adopted without considering whether 
homeownership provides the best possible means to ensure low to moderate-income 
households’ access affordable housing of acceptable quality. As seen in the example of the 
failure of Section 235, low-income households are less capable of facing the uncertainty of 
fluctuating housing user costs in the long run. The economic benefits to low-income households 
of homeownership depends on whether or not owning a home is a better long-term strategy for 
wealth accumulation than renting or investing in other financial assets. The gains of 
homeownership to low and moderate income households are found to be more sensitive to 
factors such as when such buyers enter and exit the cycle of housing prices, the number of units 
they are able to invest in simultaneously and how long they are able to hold their investments. 
Considering that these variables are not considered in the federal policy framework specifically 
targeting low-income homeownership, it is important to question whether or not 
homeownership as strongly emphasized by the federal government is the most appropriate 
presumption for federal housing policies, especially when income inequality has been 
consistently increasing over the last several decades (Shlay 2006, 519). 
 
While promoting homeownership has been a consistent aspect of federal housing policies, the 
federal government to a lesser extent also provides assistance in the form of subsidies for low-
income households. This is provided in three specific ways: the direct promotion of the 
construction and development of specific low and moderate income housing developments, 
assistance to renters to pay for private rental units through the voucher system; the funding of 
state and local authorities to develop housing through the block grant system (Schwartz 2006, 
5). The Housing Act of 1949 and the accompanying title programs consolidated the efforts of 
the federal government to support public housing projects starting in the 1930s, especially 
concerning slum clearance and the aim to rehouse the majority of the American population in 
European-style public housing projects (von Hoffmann 1996, 424). However, similar to the 
controversial handling of the Section 235 program, the Title III amendment to the Act, which 
engaged the federal government in building 810,000 new public housing units, was eventually 
challenged and subjected to conditions that rendered it ineffective in achieving its original goal. 
On the contrary, the Title II program of the same Act, which increased the FHA’s authorization 
of mortgage insurance, was termed more successful than the others in achieving its aim of 
extending homeownership (Lang and Sohmer 2000, 296).  
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The direct intervention in the provision of public housing by the federal government has always 
been met with political resistance; implementation problems associated with the public sector 
engaging in activities dominated by the private sector and the inability to successfully translate 
program initiatives into workable housing solutions for the poor have historically impeded 
further development of such initiatives at the federal level. The Housing Act of 1949 is even 
seen to have created outcomes contradicting its original aim of creating decent housing for all 
Americans; the urban redevelopment policies it advocated led to more units being destroyed in 
the name of urbanization than were eventually replaced. The Act also attempted to generate 
‘visionary’ changes in public housing by constructing high-rise buildings as a source of 
affordable housing for the poor, leading to an increase in racial discrimination and income 
inequality amongst the urban poor where they became concentrated in areas dominated by such 
federal housing projects (von Hoffmann 1996, 424).  
 
Conclusion 
The conclusion to this chapter will analyze whether the adoption of federal housing policies in 
the direction of homeownership can still be considered valid given the changes in the trends 
towards homeownership following the most recent financial crisis. Until WWII a sizeable 
proportion of households in the United States were renters as opposed to owners of their own 
home, with urban areas being more highly populated than suburban areas (Schwartz 2006, 11). 
Housing policies and programs prior to 1934, had not yet evolved to the federal level as they did 
during the Great Depression. Additionally during this time, the private construction of 
residential homes and commercial mortgage lending were less interlinked than they are today, 
while the oversight of safety and habitability standards of properties and the protection of 
existing property owners was mainly the remit of state and local governments (Landis and 
McClure 2010, 321 and Carliner 1998, 304). 
 
Closer to the early 2000s it is very evident that this trend had been completely reversed with a 
marked increase in the suburban versus urban population (although urban population density is 
considered higher than suburban), and the total number of renters declining in comparison to the 
number of homeowners (Schwartz 2006, 11). These facts, as pointed out by Schwartz in the 
2006 edition of his book Housing Policy in the United States, correctly described trends in the 
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housing sector; that is, until the onset of the Great Recession in 2007 when the US housing 
market crashed and housing prices plummeted, setting in motion a series of changes in housing 
consumption patterns that were quite different from what they had been in the run-up to the 
global financial crisis. 
 
Subsequent trends in the private housing sector have shown a decline in the profitability of 
owner-occupied housing in comparison to rental housing. Figures1, 2 and 3 at the end of this 
chapter reflect data on the United States between 2000 and 2016 and indicate trends in rent 
prices, real house prices and rent-to-price ratios (measure of profitability of owner- occupied 
housing), between 2006 and 2017 from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Housing Indicator for 2018 with base year in 2010. Figures 1 and 2 
respectively show that there has been a larger increase in rental prices from the base year of 
2010 to 2016 (16 index points) than in the real price of housing within the same period (around 
14 index points). This indicates a growing demand for rental housing rather than owner 
occupied housing in the United States during the period of recovery following the global 
financial crisis, in spite of the rebound in the housing market as seen in figure 2 indicating the 
trends in real prices.  
 
This change can be explained to an extent by the continued stringency in mortgage lending; the 
reduction in credit on homeownership rates has caused a 7 percent decline between 2005 and 
2015 that could not significantly be explained by the usual demographic argument of unfair 
lending practices directed toward blacks and racial minorities (Goodman and Mayer 2018). A 
more robust explanation for this trend is the rise in single-family rental units that have been 
absorbing most of the housing demand in the post recessionary recovery period, instead of 
owner-occupied homes (Strochak 2017 and Sullivan 2017). In the period immediately following 
the recession, as foreclosure rates for single-family units began to increase, institutional 
investors quickly began to buy up these units for below market value rates. Given the tighter 
post-recession mortgage lending terms, middle-to-low-income households are beginning to shift 
to renting single-family units where they would have instead purchased them at the height of the 
property boom, just prior to the recession.  
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This spike in demand has even initiated a change in the home-building market, where housing 
firms are beginning to actively adopt a ‘build-to-rent model’ to cater to the growing demand 
(Sullivan 2017). While institutional investors still remain a relatively small proportion of the 
single-family rental market, owning around 2 percent of the estimated 15 million single-family 
rental units nationwide in comparison with 55 percent of the multifamily rental units, this new 
trend appears to be bolstered by demographic and housing-market conditions that are increasing 
the demand for rental units rather than homeownership (Strochak 2017)  
 
However, in spite of the changes in investment trends that have been building up over the past 
decade or so in the post recessionary phase, the federal policy space concerning housing has not 
adapted significantly to accommodate them; this is counterintuitive considering that the last set 
of significant changes in housing policy were precipitated by the Great Depression, an economic 
meltdown of similar and greater proportions. 
 
The housing sector in the United States is still characterized by an overdependency on the 
private sector and the private mortgage market, supplying the needed housing stock and 
financing respectively, to meet the demand for housing across the majority of the consumer 
income spectrum. This inadvertently leads to a worsening of the affordability of owner-occupied 
housing when incomes are not growing in proportion with house prices and mortgage credit is 
more difficult to access. The same applies to rental housing when rent-to-price ratios are 
comparatively low (Gallin 2004); a trend that is re-emerging following its increase during the 
Global Financial Crisis (see Figure 3 below). A declining stock of affordable housing in the 
private and public sectors further adds to the downward pressure on affordability, especially in 
times of demand shocks. Yet there are no signs of any significant federal housing policy 
changes being proposed to counter such problems in a manner that does not focus on 
homeownership, which under the given circumstances of the most recent recession being 
precipitated by inconsistencies in the primary secondary mortgage markets begs the question as 
to why a different federal approach based on the direct provisioning of housing is not on the 
horizon. The answer lies in the bias of the United States housing sector towards owner 
occupancy (across all income groups) as a result of the approaches adopted under federal 
housing policy changes beginning in the 1930s and the subsequent legislation and programs that 
were established to promote countercyclical macro policy.  
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Figure 1: Rent Price Index with Base Year 2010 
 
Source: OECD (2018), Housing (indicator). doi: 10.1787/63008438-en (Accessed on 20 February 2018) 
 
 
Figure 2: Real House Price Index with Base Year 2010 
 
Source: OECD (2018), Housing (indicator). doi: 10.1787/63008438-en (Accessed on 20 February 2018) 
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Figure 3: Rent to Price Index with Base Year 2010 
 
Source: OECD (2018), Housing (indicator). doi: 10.1787/63008438-en (Accessed on 20 February 2018) 
 
 
IV. HOUSING SECTOR: THE DYNAMICS OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
 
The basic policy tools employed by the federal government concerning housing aimed to 
increase the overall level of homeownership. Policies toward the latter part of the twentieth 
century were extended to promote residential construction and to increase homeownership 
amongst low- and moderate-income households. In line with housing policies first drafted in the 
1930s, they focused on indirectly stimulating the demand and supply of housing in the 
economy, by promoting greater access to bank mortgage financing or providing tax credits to 
home owners and investors rather than directly intervening in the housing market to ensure that 
the ultimate goal of housing policy, as eloquently extolled by the Housing Act of 1949, that 
“every American deserves a decent home and a suitable living environment” is ultimately 
achieved (Lang and Sohmer 2000). 
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In spite of the focus of federal housing policy on homeownership and its importance on the 
dynamics of the macroeconomy, there is a dearth of academic literature associated with the 
macroeconomic view and impact of the housing sector on it. Leung’s (2004) literature review on 
macroeconomics and housing highlights examples of this lack. He points out that publications 
such as the Origins of Macroeconomics by Robert Dimand, which cite the most important 
contributions to the field of macroeconomics from a wide range of economic scholars, only 
mentions Fisher’s 1933 paper on debt deflation as having any links with the housing sector. 
Similarly in the Landmark Papers in Economic Fluctuations, Economic Policy and Related 
Subjects edited by Nobel Prize Laureate Lawrence Klein, lists only one paper out of a 
compilation of 40 selected papers, titled “The Relation of Home Investment to Unemployment” 
by R.F. Kahn, that relates directly to the housing sector.  
 
On the other hand, the literature associating housing finance and the macroeconomy appears to 
be more exhaustive. Leung cites the example of the Handbook of the Economics of Finance 
Vols. 1A-B, edited by G. Constantinides, M. Harris and R. Stulz, which includes two macro-
oriented papers that deal specifically with real-estate housing and the macroeconomy: 
“Consumption-based asset pricing” by John Campbell and the “Equity Premium in Retrospect” 
by Rajnish Mehra and Edward Prescott. The rest of the publication involves specific content that 
relates to the overlap between the financial sector and the macroeconomy. It is not a surprise 
that the overlap in academic research between finance and the macroeconomy is more prevalent 
than housing itself, considering that the main impact of fiscal policies concerning housing were 
primarily aimed at influencing the housing sector via the financial sector. The analysis of the 
effects of changes in the financial sector on the overall economy may therefore take precedence 
over the study of the impact of the housing sector on the economy.  
 
Even though mainstream economic theory may not have acknowledged the importance of the 
housing sector in the macroeconomy, its impact on major macro indicators cannot be ignored. 
This is simply because of the fact that the housing sector constitutes a significant portion of US 
GDP. The figure titled: “Residential Investment as a Share of GDP” below shows the trends of 
the share of residential fixed investment in GDP from 1934 to 2017, while the figure titled: 
“Percentage Share of Residential Investment in GDP” shows the percentage shares of the same.  
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Figure 4: Residential Investment as a Share of GDP (1934-2017) 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product) 
 
Figure 5: Percentage Share of Residential Investment in GDP 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product) 
 
Since 1934, residential housing (excluding housing services) has constituted between 0.7 
percent and 6.9 percent of GDP and on average 4.3 percent of GDP, declining to a 65-year low 
of 2.5 percent during the Great Recession. The stock of residential housing in the United States 
is composed of a) private sector owner-occupied and rental accommodation (single family and 
multifamily units) and b) publicly owned housing stock.  
 34 
 
The most prominent source of housing at the national level originates in the private sector. This 
is evident from the trends in public and private expenditure on the construction of residential 
housing between 2002 and 2017 as shown in the figure below. 
 
Figure 6: Private Residential and Public Residential Construction as a Percentage of Total 
Construction (1993-2017) 
 
Source: Unites States Census Bureau (2018)  
 
The figure above on private and public residential construction as a percentage of total 
construction shows that the proportion of public spending on residential construction out of total 
construction in the US economy is extremely low in comparison to that of private spending, 
indicating that the majority of housing demand clears through the private sector. The importance 
of the owner-occupied housing market in the overall housing sector can be understood by 
observing the trends in average homeownership rates of each decade between 1900 and 2000, in 
relation to the changes in national population growth over the same period, as represented in the 
figures below: 
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Figure 7: Homeownership Rates in the United States (1900-2000) 
 
Source: United States Census Bureau, Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division (Last Revised: 
October 31, 2011) 
 
Figure 8: Total Population of the United States in millions (1900-2000) 
 
Source: United States Census Bureau, decennial census of population, 1900 to 2000.  
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From this data we get a sense of how homeownership has consistently been on the rise and in 
line with population growth over this time period. It can be surmised that for such an ideological 
perception of homeownership to not only sustain itself but to consistently gain traction over the 
years there must have been some form of reinforcing framework that carried it forward over the 
20 century; especially during the post-WWII period and the time just prior to the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2007−09. This framework indeed presents itself in the form of the federal 
housing policy reforms that were enacted in response to the Great Depression in 1929, as seen 
above in chapter III. 
 
The United States National Housing Sector: A Theoretical Overview of its Dynamics and 
Importance in the Macroeconomy  
As seen above, an often-cited point within the existing academic literature on housing is the lack 
of focus on its importance within the macroeconomy. Indeed it has only been in more recent 
years following the last housing-related economic crisis that more efforts have been undertaken 
to study the dynamics of the housing sector, in order to better understand the role of the varying 
endogenous and exogenous factors that determine how the aggregate housing market functions; 
some of the findings in this regard are reported in this chapter. As a first step however, it is 
necessary to highlight the importance of the housing sector in the macroeconomy, as a preface 
to the theoretical models that determine how the demand and supply of housing function.  
 
The contribution of construction-related activity, especially residential construction, has a 
significant impact on the GDP of an economy via the output generated by construction-related 
jobs and the demand for construction-related capital (material and equipment) (Leamer 2007). 
The aggregate construction sector, inclusive of both residential and commercial construction, 
presents a unique characteristic; the sector follows a long wave cycle with an approximate 
duration of 15 to 25 years. Aggregate output growth tends to alternate between rapid and slow 
growth on a long wave cycle with intervals of 15−25 years. These long ‘swings’ in output tend 
to follow similar long interval swings that occurred at the same time in other sectors 
(Abramovitz 1964, 2). The volume of output generated through construction has followed 
cyclical patterns of roughly the same duration as the long swings in the rate of growth of 
aggregate output, especially in the sector of nonfarm residential building (Abramovitz 1964, 5). 
Abramovitz’s 1964 paper highlights that such observed long swings in output growth are the 
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result of swings in the rate of growth or resources and swings in the intensity with which these 
resources have been used, which in turn relate to effective demand in the economy.  
 
Both of these factors have an important effect on capital formation, which influences the growth 
of production capacity as well as the growth of effective demand in the economy (Abramovitz 
1964, 3-4). The capacity to produce is extended by gross capital formation through the 
introduction of substitutes for old technology; net increases of capital increase the productivity 
of labor. The growth of effective demand increases as the rate of change of gross capital 
formation increases either directly through an anticipated increase in gross investment 
expenditures or indirectly through the effect of any changes in investment expenditures on the 
growth of income and consumption. The construction sector possesses the unique capacity to 
influence capital formation in both of the ways described above: growth in the construction 
sector has a positive impact on both effective demand and the capacity to produce (i.e., he 
growth of resources) (Abramovitz 1964). 
 
However in order for the residential construction sector to effectively serve this dual role of 
influencing capital formation, the housing market (i.e., the market in which the output generated 
by construction is bought and sold) should be based on a reasonably flexible price system to 
ensure that resources (labor and capital) are productively employed (Leamer 2007, 153). 
Unfortunately the prices of homes are rigid in a downward trending market. If effective demand 
in the market for homes (or even investments in residential property developments) dips, the 
adjustment in the market occurs at the volume level rather than the price level.  
 
The inflexibility of prices is especially detrimental when the housing market is in decline, 
because the downward adjustment of volume in place of price, leads to a decline in sales and 
thus a decline in the jobs associated with construction, finance and real-estate brokerages 
(Leamer 2007, 177). If prices were less sticky the volume adjustment during a housing market 
decline that leads to less than full employment in residential construction and its affiliated 
sectors, could be avoided allowing the housing cycle to stabilize quickly back to normal sales 
volumes (Leamer 2007, 177). 
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This inflexibility in prices is seen both within the existing stock of housing as well as newly 
built homes. Current homeowners (sellers) are backward looking and being concerned with the 
price they have paid for their homes remain in a position of “loss aversion” (Leamer 2007, 177) 
by not risking the worth of what they have paid for their house in a weak market. At the same 
time prospective homeowners are forward looking in terms of the value appreciation that may 
occur in the real estate that they purchase. Thus in a rising market, sellers estimate that the value 
of their homes would be less than prospective buyers anticipate and decide to sell. On the 
contrary in a falling market sellers remember the price they originally paid to purchase the home 
while buyers anticipate ever declining prices as time progresses, leading to stagnation in both 
home sales and purchases (Leamer 2007, 177). 
 
The weak price transmission mechanism in the residential housing market is counterintuitive to 
its role as a federal policy tool to establish stability within the economy. A macro stabilizer 
should ideally serve to regulate the trajectory of the economy in both explosive downturns as 
well as upswings, but as the case turns out, the residential housing market tends to serve this 
purpose only when the economy is in recession.  
 
To see how this is let us consider first the dynamics of the owner-occupied housing sector in the 
specific scenario in which prices in the residential housing market are rising. The impact this 
will immediately have is to cause the economic prospects of investment in the supply of owner 
occupied housing to be increasingly positive as time goes by, prompting a rise in the rate of 
issuance of housing permits (starts), which in turn signals a rise in the potential number of new 
units that can be released for sale once the construction is complete at a later time period. This 
stimulates growth in the economic activity of owner occupied housing construction and its 
affiliated sectors, leading to higher employment and output generation within these sectors. 
Prices in the residential housing sector will continue to rise at a faster rate, evidenced by a 
consistent trend of higher than overall market rate of inflation during the upswing of the 
business cycle until it attenuates due an unsustainable level of inflation. But once prices in the 
residential housing sector (now comprising of both old stock whose prices have also appreciated 
in line with the current market price of new stock) have risen they tend to exhibit a rigidity 
toward decline, as would be seen in other sectors moving in line with the business cycle.  
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As explained above, this is mainly due to the fact that it is cheaper and faster for the supply of 
housing units to be controlled through the number of vacant units that are available for sale or 
rent; once the initial number of housing starts has spurred a boom in construction they will 
result in an increase in the number of vacant units that remain unsold or unrented rather than a 
physical decline in the total level of stock. Thus, when home prices were rising in the boom 
phase of the business cycle, the rise in demand for and sales of residential housing units would 
be absorbed by old units whose owners and prospective buyers agree on their backward and 
forward outlook on prices respectively, by old units that had previously remained unsold from 
previous boom phases in the housing cycle and by new units arising from the current boom in 
housing starts whose characteristics and prices matched the demand in the market for old units. 
The latter two groups of housing units comprise the set of vacant units that are available for sale 
and also apply in the context of rentals.  
 
Thus it becomes clear that at the beginning of a boom in the housing cycle we may have a 
higher level of demand relative to the supply of physical housing units and as prices rise this 
stimulates construction to meet that demand, but towards the end of the cycle when the wave of 
construction of new units reaches completion and most of the old stock has been sold to meet 
rising demand that there would be a residual amount of new stock that contributes to vacancies 
in the next housing cycle.  
 
On the other hand, when prices are declining, old stock remains intact (but unmaintained) while 
investment in the construction of new stock stimulated through new housing starts begins to 
dwindle to a level that existed before the boom or perhaps even lower based on what the 
expectations of house prices will be, meaning that supply remains relatively inelastic in the face 
of changing prices, leading to a loss of jobs and contraction of the residential construction 
sector. The demand for owner-occupied housing (across both old and new units) by buyers 
remains high in a declining market but if suppliers (owners) of owner-occupied housing are 
unwilling to sell at prices that are not sufficiently above their actual purchase price they will 
hold on to their homes and not sell.  
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This simply means two things: that there is no new stock being invested in to meet the relatively 
high demand for owner-occupied housing in a declining market, and that potentially, owners of 
old units do not release their units into the available supply; leaving a gap in the effective 
demand for owner-occupied housing (a sort of latent level of effective demand that serves as the 
substrate for the next housing cycle stimulated by demand –led policies). 
 
In order to have a full understanding of the dynamics of the housing sector we must also address 
the rental sector and not just the owner-occupied sector in isolation, because rented units serve 
as the direct substitute to owner-occupied housing (Riddel 2004, 124) for a vast majority of 
those who demand owner-occupied housing when they can afford it. The stock of new rental 
housing in any time period is supplied by those who chose to invest in the construction of 
multifamily units or single-family units specifically for the purpose of renting in a prior period, 
while the existing stock of rental housing serves to meet the demand for rental housing in the 
short run. The changes in the demand for rental housing may in part be viewed as a residual of 
the demand for owner occupied housing; income shocks or a sudden spike in user cost or the 
cost of maintaining an owner-occupied home may result in home-owners trading down or losing 
ownership of their homes through default on their mortgages, resulting in a sudden spike in the 
demand for rentals in the short run. The latter however is representative of a subset of the 
demand for rental units that overlaps with the demand for owner-occupied housing where the 
preference remains for owner-occupied housing provided household budget constraints are less 
restrictive.  
 
Another and perhaps more substantial subset of the rental demand is represented by households 
who are in the middle income bracket of the population, whose demand for rental units between 
geographical areas (where the cost of moving between these areas is negligible) tends to be 
either more price elastic or income elastic in the short run. In other words, for example, a small 
increase in the rents in area A because of gentrification will lead to a large increase in the 
demand for rental units in area B where the rents have not been impacted by gentrification. The 
remainder of the demand for rental units comprises those who are in the low-income category of 
households, especially those who require the use of welfare assistance (such as housing 
vouchers) to afford to rent their homes. Interestingly, a paper by Malpezzi and Vandell (2002) 
on whether or not the low income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program led to an increase in 
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the supply of housing, indicated that the income elasticity of demand for housing, which by 
assumption should be rental housing for low-income households, tends to be relatively low; in 
other words the relatively sizeable increases in purchasing power from such allowances results 
only in minor increases in spending on housing.  
 
As in the previous example, consider a scenario where the prices of owner occupied housing are 
rising, how would this impact the demand and supply for rental homes in the long run? Gallin 
(2004) shows through the use of a long-horizon regression approach to a standard error 
correction model that in a scenario where housing prices are rising (i.e., that they are high 
relative to rents and the rent to price ratio is low) changes in real rents (price deflated nominal 
rents) tend to be larger than usual and changes in real prices tend to be smaller than usual. 
Gallin’s premise is that there should not be a significant difference between the appreciation in 
housing prices and rents, given that both depend primarily on the user cost (which in itself is a 
function of the marginal tax rate and interest rate). But his findings indicate that between 1994 
and 2004 (just before the great financial crisis) nominal house prices increased by 70 percent but 
the indexes for tenants and owner’s imputed (equivalent) rent in CPI shows that it had increased 
by less than half as much, which is counter-intuitive since imputed rents are considered a 
fundamental determinant of housing value, so prices and rents should be more or less in line 
with each other. His other findings include the fact that periods in which house prices are high 
relative to rents appear to be followed by periods in which the real rent growth is faster than 
usual and real house-price growth is slower than usual and that the response of prices dominated 
that of rents.  
 
It is interesting to note that these findings were based on data from the period just prior to the 
Global Financial Crisis; a time when the mortgage lending market was beginning to change its 
approach towards moderate and low-income households and when both the Clinton and Bush 
administrations enacted policies that expanded the base of low-income homeowners, resulting in 
a supernormal rate of increase in housing prices just prior to the great recession. The model 
would however have accurately predicted the period of faster real rent growth following the 
crisis given that the large number of foreclosures on low-income owner-occupied homes would 
have resulted in a spike in the demand for rental housing, with the simultaneous slowing down 
of real house price growth without the dominating effect of price on rent in this special instance. 
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Unfortunately the model makes no specific mention of the distribution of income between 
households that rent and households that own homes. This is an important distinction, discussed 
further below, given that the impacts, and the subsequent outcomes, on the demand for rental 
units and the demand for owner-occupied housing under conditions of inelastic short-run supply 
tends to vary across the income distribution of households, especially in the wake of a demand-
led policy approach used to stimulate the macroeconomy. 
 
External Factors That Impact Short-Run Demand and Supply Other Than Prices 
The general discussion of the dynamics in the housing sector typically begins at the point where 
housing prices are already either rising or falling. As we have seen so far, the downward rigidity 
in the price mechanism results in volume adjustments to arrive at a new equilibrium. Thus while 
price disturbances are relatively slow to catch on in the short term how then is the housing 
sector stimulated to move up without the aid of price signals? This is the question we addressed 
in this section. 
 
Refer to the previous example in which housing prices are rising. This is an indicator of stable 
macroeconomic growth and also therefore of rising inflation (including a much more rapid 
increase in inflation in home prices). However the rise in overall inflation (which is strongly 
influenced by inflation in the housing sector) is a phenomenon that needs to be controlled in the 
short-term; in other words over a time horizon that is more restricted than the natural rise and 
fall in volume adjustments in the supply of housing. To curb the rise in inflation during a 
business cycle and housing market upswing, monetary policy raises short-term interest rates, 
increasing the borrowing costs to both suppliers of new housing units (affecting expectations of 
housing supply) as well as the user costs to buyers of both existing and new owner-occupied 
units. These effects in turn impact the expected returns on investment in owner-occupied 
housing (both from the suppliers’ in the immediate future and buyers’ perspectives further into 
the future) as changing interest rates begin to alter expectations of future house-price 
movements (Mishkin 2008). Thus the transmission mechanism of monetary policy takes place 
through the housing market.  
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There are two other factors that are not related to the cost of construction that impact the supply 
of housing: the mismatch between the availability of land and areas where individuals have a 
higher than normal preference to reside (usually areas that are highly developed metropolitan 
areas) and land use restrictions (Mishkin 2008). In the case of the former, unoccupied land that 
is easily and readily available for development may not be desirable whereas the converse is 
true in more highly desirable urban areas where employment opportunities and amenities are 
relatively more abundant. The general long-run equilibrium model of the housing sector 
assumes that an increase in prices will lead to an overall increase in investment in residential 
construction (ceteris paribus), with such a model implying that high price levels imply high 
levels of investment in construction. However in reality the existence of restrictive land-use 
regulation can in fact slow the growth in housing stock. Land-use restrictions therefore limit the 
number and size of residential structures that are permitted within any given lot. This implies 
that the elasticities of supply through vacancy adjustments vary between areas as a result of 
these two key factors (Mishkin 2008; Riddel 2004; Green Malpezzi and Mayo 2005 and 
Malpezzi and Vandell 2002).  
 
Other sources of demand disturbances that act in the short run according to Riddel (2004), are 
changes in marginal tax rates, changes in household consumption behavior, tastes and 
preferences for home size and location or other amenities, stock market volatility and the 
preferred composition of household financial portfolios for long-term versus short-term 
investments. Supply disturbances would be, supply-side shocks rapid changes in building 
material costs / changes in international trading agreements, changes in construction 
employment, wages through labor mobility, change in lending rates for construction and 
development loans. 
 
Given this general presentation of the operation of the housing sector operates over the long 
cycle and the observed factors that influence the demand and supply in the short run when the 
price mechanism is relatively unresponsive, the next step is to understand the framework that 
condenses these points into a long-run equilibrium model and how such a model explains the 
asymmetry between demand and supply in the housing sector. 
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Long-Run Equilibrium Demand for Housing 
According to existing housing demand theory, long-run equilibrium demand for current 
housing, is a function of price and a set of demand variables such as income and long-term 
interest rates. Riddel (2004) uses this as a basis to develop a model for the disequilibrium of the 
housing market (and uses data on single-family units between 1967 and 1998 to test the model). 
The model sets prices, housing stocks, residential rents (including imputed rents), construction 
costs and vacancy rates as nonstationary endogenous variables while the economic growth rate, 
interest rates, income and the stock of multifamily units are exogenous variables. Application of 
the model on the chosen set of data found that the income elasticity of demand for single-family 
units is approximately 2.7 and that the long-run elasticity of demand is approximately 2.8. 
Surprisingly, Riddel’s results show that user cost is not a significant determinant of long-run 
housing demand, but, as seen earlier, is more effective in influencing demand decisions in the 
short run. The mean rental elasticity is 0.27, meaning that 1 percent drop in rents leads to a 0.27 
percent increase in the demand for owner-occupied housing. Rental elasticities tend to be higher 
for those households that face stricter borrowing terms than those that do not and in general tend 
to also be lower than the price elasticity of demand. In the case of the latter, we can assume that 
it may be easier to trade up/trade down between owner-occupied homes than it is to move 
between rental agreements due to penalties on breach of rental agreements and to moving costs 
that add up to a higher proportion of income for renters than the average homeowner. In the 
long run therefore, the strongest determinants of housing demand overall are income and price 
and to a lesser extent rents, and the eventual price appreciation and changes in interest rates 
affect the flow of new investment in housing demanded rather than the stock. A highly relevant 
finding that Riddel emphasizes is that interest rate changes do not have a significant impact on 
the demand for housing of existing homeowners but it did have a significant impact on those 
entering or leaving the market and those who were entering the market as first-time 
homeowners – thus they have a stronger impact on new investment flows rather than on existing 
stocks. 
 
Long-Run Equilibrium Supply for Housing 
The basis for the supply theory of housing as outlined by Riddel (2004) is that housing which is 
a durable good constitutes a market that has both a flow dimension and a stock dimension. 
Increases in the new investment of housing stock contribute to the flow of housing stock in any 
 45 
time period, and therefore net investment, which is the difference between the sum of new 
residential construction and the depreciation of existing units, becomes the primary focus when 
attempting to stimulate growth in the housing sector. According to Di Pasquale and Wheaton 
(1994), the supply theory of housing assumes that the long-run equilibrium in the supply of 
housing stock is dependent on price and a vector of other cost-shifting variables, already 
encountered above. Thus, housing investment or new construction is directly related to the price 
level and an overall increase in the price level leads to permanent increases in new construction. 
Riddel’s model found that the long run price elasticity of supply was between 0.025 and 0.49, in 
line with other similar studies conducted. However Goodman (2005) shows that supply 
elasticities in central city areas (where land use restrictions are stronger) vary significantly based 
on whether the flow of housing units (new units) are either increasing or decreasing. Goodman 
finds that supply elasticities of the flow of housing in declining cities were between +0.03 and 
+0.13 (relatively inelastic) but that for expanding cities the elasticities of supply of the flow of 
housing were between +1.05 and +1.08 (relatively elastic), indicating an asymmetric or 
“kinked” supply response in the new investment in housing stock depending on whether the rate 
of new investment is either increasing or decreasing (Goodman 2005, 332).  
 
The Dynamics of the Aggregate Housing Market: a Summary 
Thus, over the long cycle of the housing sector, demand for housing is most responsive to 
interest-rate changes and price changes but in the short run, once prices have increased during a 
housing sector upswing, they remain rigid in the downward direction, with volume adjustments 
in new investment and a slowing down of the sale of existing stock taking place to enable the 
market to reach a temporary equilibrium that becomes disrupted by another supply or demand 
side factor. Thus price adjustments in line with demand or supply occur over a longer period 
more coherent with the long wave of the housing cycle and so price appreciation and changes in 
interest rates tend to impact the flow rather than the stock demand of housing. Rents have a 
lower impact on the decision to invest in owner-occupied housing. Thus, because of the 
continuous disruption that exists in the short run, there is an inadequate level of adjustment in 
prices and the housing market supply and demand remain in disequilibrium, with extended 
periods of either excess supply or demand. Supply in the short run, however, is even more 
inelastic than demand because of limitations on land-use rights and differences in preferences of 
where households choose to live in relation to the availability of land that can be developed, and 
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so also contributes to the lack of responsiveness of supply to changes in price in the short run. In 
the long run there is also asymmetry within the supply of new investment in housing (based on 
whether new investment is occurring at an increasing or decreasing rate) that renders the supply 
of new housing asymmetric, making long-run equilibrium between demand and supply even 
more difficult to achieve in areas that are in decline, where new investment is less likely to 
occur but demand may still be fairly high in comparison to the available stock. 
 
The Impact of Demand-led Federal Policy on the Dynamics of an Asymmetric Housing 
Market 
Having understood the dynamics of the housing sector in terms of how demand and supply are 
modeled and what factors impact them over the long swing housing sector cycle, it is clear that 
the asymmetry that exists is based on factors that impact prices disproportionately between 
supply and demand; prices are more responsive to demand-side shocks than supply-side shocks, 
whereas the adjustment of the volume of housing stock is solely responsive toward supply side 
shocks (Riddel 2004). This may be why the analysis of the impacts of such shocks is studied in 
isolation from each other.  
 
However, apart from the existence of this asymmetry, a downward trend in the housing sector 
first generates adjustments in the employment of resources such as labor and capital to reduce 
the rate of growth in the volume of stock (because existing stock cannot be diminished and 
projects tend not to remain incomplete but spread over a longer horizon). Similarly, to stimulate 
growth in the employment of capital and labor associated with the construction sector that 
would follow a long swing cycle, the growth in volume of new stock needs to be stimulated, 
given the varying restrictions associated with land use and other non-price related factors that 
introduce rigidities and inefficiencies in the market in the short term. The latter explains the 
main goal that federal housing sector policy initiatives have focused on achieving, and the 
simplest way to achieve this is by reducing the budget constraints of investors and the end 
consumers of residential housing, through changes in marginal tax and interest rates.  
 
Of course investment decisions (to enter into construction of both owner occupied or rental 
units) are dependent on the level aggregate demand there is in the housing economy, but this is 
now highly dependent on the level of user cost associated with homeownership as well as the 
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expectation of positive wealth effects in the future for potential homeowners. However, wealth 
effects cannot be impacted positively without a more flexible price mechanism in combination 
with lower user costs, and since the prices respond primarily to demand-side disturbances, the 
simplest policy tool that the federal government can employ would indeed focus on demand-
side measures that are tied to the reduction of household budget constraints and constraints on 
housing investment (expansion of household income through wider access to expanded 
mortgage credit and reductions in marginal tax rates or interest rates). However this bias 
towards demand-led growth-promoting strategies without the aid of countercyclical policies to 
support the housing sector in times of a down-side have negative impacts that affect households 
at different levels along the overall distribution of income differently, which will be elaborated 
upon in the next section. Thus demand-led housing policy based on Keynesian pump-priming 
principles makes the housing sector as it exists and is governed today, more of a macro-
economic stimulant than the macro-economic stabilizer that it ought to be. 
 
What is Missing From These Models/Analysis of the Housing Sector?  
Most studies undertaken to explain the dynamics of the housing sector tend to focus on only 
specific parts of the sector, such as owner-occupied housing or rental housing independently, or 
to focus their analysis on the specific impact of a piece of housing-related legislature on either 
owner-occupied housing or rental housing. Even formulating a coherent model of the housing 
sector that encompasses all the constituent elements of housing demand and supply is difficult, 
simply given the nature of the good itself− a long-lived, durable good whose purchase in the 
modern-day housing market is largely not possible without mortgage debt and whose supply is 
restricted by non price related variables such as land use restrictions.  
 
However an important aspect of modeling the housing sector that is not particularly covered in 
analysis is the dual role that housing plays as a capital (investment) good and as a necessity 
good. While the purchase value of owner-occupied housing is accounted for in GDP as a capital 
investment, any imputed rents from the house are now accounted for as a consumption 
component. However this dual role that owner-occupied housing plays has more far-reaching 
effects in the economy. An owner occupied unit serves not only as an investment in the form of 
a long-lived asset that helps to generate wealth effects in a rising housing market, it is also the 
owner’s primary source of shelter and stability− a place to raise a family, a primary necessity to 
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safeguard other assets, and forms a basis for further consumption in the form of goods and 
services that add to a basic standard of living. The effects on the demand and supply of owner-
occupied housing have an impact on rental housing which becomes its direct substitute when the 
housing market is in decline. The consumer of rental housing, which is entirely a normal good 
and does not possess the characteristics of an investment good like owner-occupied housing, is 
more likely to be on the lower end of the income distribution and thus more susceptible to 
effects of demand-shocks introduced by demand-led policies in a capital constrained housing 
market in the short run.  
 
Conclusion 
From the above, we can infer that it appears easier and more fruitful in terms of overall growth 
to jump-start the economy at large by leveraging the growth in the residential construction 
sector, irrespective of where the demand for owner-occupied housing lies. Fiscal policies that 
impact user cost, the main decision factor in homeownership and monetary policies targeting the 
expectations in housing prices prove effective in achieving this jump-start where actual long-
wave price fluctuations that follow the housing cycle appear sticky over the short-run timelines 
that these policies tend to follow. So when the economy is in need of a short-term burst of 
significant growth a pump-priming strategy to get residential construction going is the simple, 
most balanced budget-friendly and liberal mechanism that can be adopted. The New Dealers 
definitely seemed to think so and drew up housing policy that promoted home-ownership as the 
fundamental utility maximization objective of every contributing economic agent at the time 
(simply by reducing their budget constraints through credit creation and a higher level of 
accessibility to mortgage financing). But what served as a fundamental objective at that point in 
time is not one that should continue to do so in an economic environment and time when the 
dynamics of home ownership are rapidly changing. The reasons for this will be discussed in the 
next section. 
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V. FEDERAL POLICIES IN AN INEFFICIENT HOUSING MARKET AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
The examination of the origins of federal housing policy in the United States in Chapter III has 
demonstrated a bias towards homeownership, as well as a bias towards the use of the housing 
sector as a basis for countercyclical macro policy. The last chapter demonstrated how the 
housing market is subject to inefficiencies caused by the asymmetry in housing supply as well 
as the short-run disequilibrium between housing supply and demand. The biased use of demand-
side macro policies in an inefficient market tends to worsen the disequilibrium between demand 
and supply that in turn tends to negatively affect households on the lower end of the income 
distribution than those on the higher end. In the long run this could predispose a number of such 
households to the threat of homelessness unless measures are taken to plug the short-term gap in 
supply that is generated by the market disequilibrium.  
 
Federal policies that promote homeownership would be beneficial to those households that can 
afford to trade up from renting to ownership, or from owning smaller owner-occupied units to 
larger or more units. Such households tend to exist within the upper end of the income 
distribution and are less likely to be negatively influenced by fluctuations in the factors that 
adversely affect affordability of housing. On the other hand, as we shall see below, households 
at the lower end of the income distribution tend to be more likely to be impacted in the short run 
by affordability problems, but that the mitigation of these problems through the current set of 
federal housing assistance programs designed for low-income households is relatively 
ineffective in an economy where there is a widening gap in low-income housing supply. The 
rest of this chapter clearly investigates how the focus of government policy in mitigating 
distributional problems associated with affordability of housing for low-income households and 
how such an approach needs to be extended to accommodate more supply-side measures. 
 
In the decades following the New Deal era when the first major housing policy reforms were 
enacted by the Federal government, a variety of policies and programs aimed at improving the 
overall distribution of housing across all income groups were introduced. However the dominant 
approach of most federal programs has shifted from the direct provision of affordable housing to 
the enhancement of affordability of housing through rental assistance and subsidy programs, 
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which are more prevalent today than programs associated with provision of public housing. This 
shift in approach has resulted in a decline in the overall supply of housing and in turn has 
rendered the programs designed to improve affordability of housing less effective; without a 
sufficient number of units to absorb spikes in effective demand (when the economy is 
improving) changes in affordability would not have as much of a positive effect as when there is 
enough supply to clear the market. Without adequate direct government intervention that 
supports the provision of a higher number of affordable public housing units to fill the gaps in 
an already inefficient private housing market, the supply needs of housing for shelter will not be 
met for a set of households who may not be able to benefit from affordability programs quick 
enough to prevent them from becoming homeless; it is these households who are more in need 
of housing as a primary source of shelter and most susceptible to losing access to it when the 
housing market fluctuates as a function of demand-led fiscal measures.  
 
The Affordability Gap 
The current government policy to reduce inefficiencies in the distribution of housing among 
low-income households is to shrink the affordability gap. To understand this policy approach, it 
is necessary to define the affordability gap and how it is determined. Affordable housing may be 
defined as expenditure of not more than 30 percent of a household’s income on housing costs 
([ICPH] 2015, 103). Factors that impact affordability are quite disparate and make it difficult to 
generate a unified model of housing affordability; the distribution of housing prices and quality, 
distribution of income, the conditions affecting the supply of new and the refurbishment of old 
housing, consumer choices, the ability of households to borrow, and public policies affecting the 
housing market all play an important role in determining the affordability of housing for any 
household (Quigley and Raphael 1994).  
 
Affordability also varies according to whether a household owns their home or rents. For 
homeowners the concept of affordability is based on the contractual terms of purchase of the 
unit and on how the loans used to purchase them are amortized. For renters on the other hand 
affordability refers to the terms of their rental agreements and the ways in which rent relates to 
income (Quigley and Raphael 1994). Figures 9 and 10 below indicate how households that rent 
face a higher burden in terms of the proportion of income spent on housing costs than 
households that live in owner-occupied units. On average between 2010 and 2016 only 7.2 
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percent of homeowners in the lowest income bracket faced housing costs above 30 percent of 
their income. This figure is even lower for households in higher income brackets. However, on 
average 23.4 percent of renter households in the lowest income bracket faced housing costs 
above 30 percent of their income, indicating that affordability problems are more likely to be 
prevalent amongst low-income renter households.  
 
Figure 9: The Percentage of Owner Occupied Units above Affordable Housing Threshold 
by Household Income 
 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau: 2012-2016 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, 2011-2015 American 
Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, 2010-2014 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, 2009-2013 5-
Year American Community Survey, 2008-2012 American Community Survey, 2007-2011 American Community 
Survey and 2006-2010 American Community Survey 
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Figure 10: The Percentage of Rental Units above Affordable Housing Threshold by 
Household Income 
 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau: 2012-2016 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, 2011-2015 American 
Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, 2010-2014 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, 2009-2013 5-
Year American Community Survey, 2008-2012 American Community Survey, 2007-2011 American Community 
Survey and 2006-2010 American Community Survey 
 
Additionally Figure 11 below indicates the ratios of price to income and rent to income between 
2000 and 2016. We can see that just prior to the sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2005−2006 the 
price to income ratio is at its highest, while rent to income is comparatively very low. This 
indicates that the housing boom, supported by increased lending to lower income households 
contributed to a dramatic rise in the price to income, while low rents kept the rent to income 
ratio low during this period. In the postrecession years from 2014 onwards we are now seeing 
both the price to income and rent to income rates rising, although the former appears to be 
happening faster than the latter. 
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Figure 11: Price-Income Ratio versus Rent- Income Ratio (2000-2017) 
 
 
Source: OECD (2018), Housing (indicator). doi: 10.1787/63008438-en (Accessed on 20 February 2018) 
 
Quigley and Raphael also state that based on their findings in their 2004 paper that the 
affordability by homeowners, who in the United States are the majority among households, has 
not declined since the 1970s but that for the remaining set of housing consumers, who are 
renters, even though the share of expenditure on rent for the median renter had only increased 
marginally, the rent burden for poor and near poor households had increased dramatically over 
the same time period. From 1960 to 2000 the rent to income ratio for the median renter in the 
bottom income quintile increased from 0.47 to 0.55 and the proportion of households spending 
more than 30 percent of their income on rent increased from 0.62 to 0.79. At the same time 
increases for households in the middle quintile were negligible and for those in the top quintile 
were more moderate (Quigley and Raphael 2004). 
 
One explanation for this may be, as seen earlier, that federal policies adopted under the Clinton 
and Bush administrations in the 1990s and early 2000s helped increase affordability of 
homeownership for low-income households through favorable tax reforms, lower lending 
restrictions, and community reinvestment initiatives in the period just prior to the Global 
Financial Crisis. When the crisis ensued in mid-2009 it led to a mass wave of foreclosures on 
the majority of newly generated low-income home mortgages and a correction in terms of the 
‘heightened’ level of affordability of homeownership.  
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With these foreclosures came an increase in the demand for rental units as homeowners who had 
lost their primary source of shelter now needed to shift to the rental sector to find housing. The 
shift in rents that had occurred during the pre-recessionary housing boom continued to increase 
following the crisis as demand for rental units increased and a shift in investment patterns 
moved new residential construction towards building to rent rather than for sale. Below is a 
figure of the OECD’s “Rent Price” Index data from 2000 to 2017, with base year set at 2010. 
The index shows that rents have increased by at least 24 percent between 2010 and 2017.  
 
Figure 12: Rent Price Index (2000-17) 
 
Source: OECD (2018), Housing (indicator) (doi: 10.1787/63008438-en (Accessed on 24 April 2018) 
 
However there has not been adequate expansion in the necessary rental assistance programs, to 
improve housing affordability for low-income households, leading to states having to finance 
the shortfall through other means ([ICPH] 2015, 103).  
 
The trends in median household income between 2005 and 2016, as seen in figure 13 below, 
indicate that income has been rising very slowly in the years following the recession; from 2005 
to the start of the recession in 2008 the median income grew approximately at an average annual 
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rate of 4.2 percent, whereas between 2010 and 2016 this dropped to 2.5 percent. In a post -
recessionary environment where incomes are not rising as quickly as housing rents, the 
affordability gap for low-income households – including those availing of rental assistance is 
increasing. Figures 14, 15 and 16 below indicate on average the number of owner-occupied and 
renter-occupied units in each income bracket for the years 2011, 2013 and 2015. The data 
indicates how the number of owner-occupied units compared to rented units is decreasing over 
this time period. In 2011 households were more likely to purchase a home rather than rent if 
they had an annual income above $25,000. In 2013 the gap between renters and owners remains 
fairly small for households with an annual income of $25,000 to $40,000 before starting to 
increase more significantly and in 2015 the renter to owner gap reduces even further for 
households with annual incomes between $25,000 and $40,000. This decline in the number of 
households with relatively lower annual incomes, purchasing homes could be the result of 
changes in demographic tastes (e.g., among Millennials) or it could be the result of high owner-
occupied unit prices relative to income. Given the fact that bank financing of mortgages has 
become more restrictive and that incomes are not growing as fast as they did prior to the 
recession, this shift may be an indicator of a lower level of affordability of homeownership 
during this period, rather than changing preferences. While it has been shown that factors 
impacting affordability are different for homeowners and renters, the fact that more lower-
income households are opting to rent will eventually lead to rents growing at a faster rate than 
incomes or rental assistance and this will eventually lead to affordability issues for renters, 
unless they can easily shift to being homeowners again. 
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Figure 13: Median Income (2005 −16) 
 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau: 2016 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, U.S. Census Bureau, 2015 
American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, 2014 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, 2013 
American Community Survey, 2012 American Community Survey, 2011 American Community Survey, 2010 
American Community Survey, 2009 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, 2008 American Community 
Survey, 2007 American Community Survey, 2006 American Community Survey and 2005 American Community 
Survey  
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Figure 14: Tenure Distribution by Household Income (2011) 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Housing Survey. (Table of 2011 National - Income Characteristics - All 
Occupied Units, Variable 1: Household Income, Variable 2: Tenure generated on 03/04/18:14:22:34)  
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Figure 15: Tenure Distribution by Household Income (2013) 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Housing Survey. (Table of 2013 National - Income Characteristics - All 
Occupied Units, Variable 1: Household Income, Variable 2: Tenure generated on 03/04/18:14:24:42) 
 
Figure 16: Tenure Distribution by Household Income (2015) 
 
 Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Housing Survey. (Table of 2015 National - Income Characteristics - All 
Occupied Units, Variable 1: Household Income, Variable 2: Tenure generated on 03/04/18:14:25:29 
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Thus the housing problem for renters (who are unable to easily switch to owning a home) can be 
summed up in terms of a growing gap between the cost of housing (including other associated 
costs such as utilities) and renter households’ incomes. Marginal increases in this affordability 
gap tend to have a more negative impact on households that spend a larger proportion of their 
income on rent, which are typically the low or extremely low-income households.  
 
Since the two main factors associated with the affordability gap, income and rent, are impacted 
by the business and housing cycle respectively, we can anticipate that as incomes fall during a 
downturn and prices (rents) remain sticky in the downward trend, that a growing proportion of 
low-income households (including those who may qualify for rental subsidies/assistance) will 
fall into the affordability gap when the business cycle contracts and moves into a recession as 
more households at the lower end of the income distribution switch from owning to renting 
homes. Given the trends seen in the most recent crisis indicate a ‘jobless recovery’ (Nikiforos 
2013) and rising rents, another recession could worsen the affordability gap for low-income and 
very low-income households. 
 
Federal Policies Used to Mitigate the Affordability Gap 
The two most prominent sources of direct government housing assistance to low-income 
households (renters) are rental vouchers (Section 8 and Housing Choice Vouchers4) and public 
housing. Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), which are government tax subsidies that 
serve as an incentive to investors to invest in low-income housing, count as indirect government 
expenditures towards rental assistance (Fischer and Sard 2017). Of these two, the federal 
government favors the promotion of the former over the latter; in 2015 out of approximately $56 
Billion spending towards rental assistance, around $30 Billion (roughly more than 50 percent) 
was spent on Section 8 voucher programs, while only $5 Billion was spent on the maintenance 
and redevelopment of public housing (Fischer and Sard, 2017).  
 
                                                        
4 The Housing Choice voucher system constitutes the largest federal government assistance program for very low-
income families (families earning 80 percent or less than their metropolitan or real area’s median income- [ICPH] 
2015, 103). Assistance extends to the elderly as well as the disabled. Under the program participants can use 
vouchers to find their own housing and is not necessary restricted to subsidized housing projects. The Housing Act 
of 1974 was established to offer the first national voucher program, known as the Section 8 Existing Housing 
Program (Schwartz 2006, 149-150). 
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 This bias towards the use of voucher programs as the main source of rental assistance may exist 
for a variety of reasons; but a major one is certainly that, rental voucher programs enable 
affordable housing units that are produced by the private sector to be absorbed more efficiently 
by low-income households and thereby justifies the investment in low-income housing by the 
private sector. As a result, affordable housing remains a viable investment option to the extent 
that rising rents do not adversely affect demand.  
 
Also, federal government tax subsidy programs as the LIHTC offer incentives to the private 
sector to invest in more affordable (low income) housing. While such incentives may not always 
result in an expansion of housing stock, they still constitute a much larger proportion of indirect 
rental assistance by the federal government than other forms of fiscal spending. A 2002 study of 
the LIHTC program and its effectiveness in increasing the supply of housing showed that it was 
not an effective incentive for the private sector to produce more low-income housing. The study 
concluded that there was no significant relationship between the number of units built through 
LIHTC and other subsidized units, in any given state and size of the existing housing stock 
(Malpezzi and Vandell 2002). 
 
In addition, rental voucher programs (such as Section 8 and the Housing Choice Voucher 
program) are means-tested forms of government assistance and are only offered to qualifying 
households; i.e., households who earn 80 percent or less of the metropolitan or rural areas 
median income and spend 30 percent or more of their income on rent to qualify for assistance 
([ICPH] 2015, 103). At first glance such programs would appear to be more cost-effective and 
timely solutions to addressing the affordability gap, but in a supply-restricted market the 
effectiveness of such policies is limited. If housing supplies could respond flexibly enough 
through the price mechanism in the short run, then rental vouchers would help to ensure that 
housing is distributed evenly enough among households across the income distribution.  
 
In fact, most low-income households do not receive the federal assistance they require; 75 
percent of low-income renters do not receive federal rental assistance (O’ Flaherty 2011; Fischer 
and Sard 2017). Even while rebounding, an economy may experience some proportion of its 
low income housing demand not being met directly as a result of inadequate rental assistance. 
This situation becomes a cause for serious concern in the event of a recession, when a much 
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higher proportion of low-income households will suddenly require assistance because not 
enough households who originally applied for assistance received the assistance they sought (O’ 
Flaherty 2011). 
 
Thus far we have seen that government incentives to boost investment in affordable housing via 
the private sector do not have the intended effect and that rental assistance provided by the 
government is not sufficient to meet the demand for affordable housing by sufficiently reducing 
the affordability gap. Furthermore, even the most dominant rental assistance programs currently 
offered cannot effectively cover the housing needs of low-income households in a supply 
restricted housing market. The only remaining viable option that can both mitigate the 
affordability gap and help reduce supply restrictiveness in the market is for the federal 
government to expand its provision of public housing to low-income households, but this 
approach is one that has been the least favored of governmental fiscal measures concerning 
housing. The national stock of public housing is being demolished at a faster rate than units are 
currently being replaced. Figure 17 below shows the total stock of public housing units for each 
year between 2000 and 2016, as reported in HUD’s annual performance and accountability 
reports for those years. We can see that public housing stock dropped by around 200,000 units 
within that time period. The percent decline of public housing stock from the previous year is 
seen in the figure 18 below. The highest drop in public housing units occurred between 2009 
and 2010, dropping almost 6.1 percent, indicating that government cut-backs on spending in the 
housing sector included the removal of units in an already supply restricted market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 62 
Figure 17: Total Number of Public Housing Units (2000−16) 
 
 
Sources: HUD Performance and Accountability Report FY 2003, FY 2006 and FY 2009. HUD Annual 
Performance Report FY 2012, FY 2013 and FY 2016. 
 
Figure 18: Percentage Decline of Public Housing Units (2000−16) 
 
Sources: HUD Performance and Accountability Report FY 2003, FY 2006 and FY 2009. HUD Annual 
Performance Report FY 2012, FY 2013 and FY 2016. 
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The reduction in public housing stock has been taking place since the 1970s and has led to a 
chronic shortage in affordable housing. This shortage in affordable housing plays a role in 
explaining the relatively high level of homelessness we see today. The decline in supply of low-
cost housing, especially among the very lowest-priced units, is the direct result of a decline in 
federal support for public housing construction, growing waiting lists for public housing, the 
fact that increasing home ownership costs leads to more frequent displacement, and 
abandonment of residential buildings and the widespread demolition of single room occupancy 
hotels that once served as a source of shelter to socio-economically displaced members of 
society. The empirical analysis conducted by Eliot and Krivo (1991) on whether or not low-
income housing impacts homelessness, concluded that a mere 1 percent increase in the quantity 
of low rent housing would decrease the national homelessness rate by 2.2 percent, making it 
quite evident that a lack of low-rent housing is related to substantially greater levels of 
homelessness (Elliot and Krivo 1991)  
 
While there are empirical studies such as the one conducted by Leung, Sarpca and Yilmaz 
(2012) that indicate that rental voucher programs lead to less distortion in social welfare than 
public housing and improve the overall level of social welfare by ensuring that housing voucher 
consumers have the option to move to neighborhoods with better schools and amenities, such 
studies are based on the primary assumption that the presence of public housing is the main 
reason the neighborhood where it is located incurs property tax losses. While historical property 
tax trends may indicate this to be true, the negative stigma attached to public housing can be 
attributed to the outcomes of the way in which the public housing program was first designed; it 
was set to prevent competition with the private housing market and to also meet strict budgetary 
restrictions imposed on it by Congress.  
 
Public housing projects since the 1930s were required to employ adverse selection, often only 
choosing tenants that were extremely poor or highly impoverished instead of catering to low-
income families, who were the original targets of the program. The programs were also poorly 
designed and constructed (to keep within the projects’ restricted budgets), and located only 
within jurisdictions that applied to host such programs, which meant they were more often 
found to be disproportionately located in areas with a high density of low-income and minority 
neighborhoods, eventually making public housing programs emblematic of underdevelopment 
 64 
and discouraged investment (Schwartz 2006, 105-8). Since the 70s public housing programs 
became less and less important as a share of fiscal expenditures. 
  
The focus of federal housing policy measures still remains on mitigating the affordability gap 
experienced by low-income households through rental assistance rather than on the expansion of 
physical housing stock to meet the supply gap. This calls into question the effectiveness of such 
programs when the supply of affordable housing continues to decline. This decline in supply of 
low-cost units is the outcome of federal housing policy that is rooted purely in demand-side 
theory biased towards home-ownership, and the private housing market to ensure that the 
housing sector remains a basis for macroeconomic policies used to stimulate economic growth. 
This stance however creates a divergence between the two main reasons for which housing is 
consumed; housing that one owns serves both as a primary source of shelter (necessity good) as 
well as a form of investment (capital good) that yields returns only if its real value exceeds user 
costs. For those who are unable to access the financial capital required to own a home, they 
must resort to consuming housing in its primary capacity; as a source of stable and dependable 
shelter.  
 
In an economy governed by federal policies structured to favor homeownership, the drive to 
consume housing for its dual benefits as a necessity good and a capital good would indefinitely 
be larger than that of consuming housing purely for the purpose of shelter (in other words 
renting). However, the choice between owning a home and renting a home is one that cannot be 
freely made as these are subject to constraints on affordability (mainly determined by income 
and the cost of homeownership) and the level of access households have to finance owning a 
home (either through savings or borrowing). The impact of these factors is a direct function of 
household income; households with high incomes tend to face a lower affordability constraint 
and access to credit than lower-income households.  
 
The kind of housing that tends to be consumed varies in a similar manner across the income 
distribution of households; lower-income households with higher constraints on affordability 
and access to credit facilities tend to rent more, while higher income households have the option 
to do either, depending on which of the two constraints makes them better off. In an 
environment where the user costs of homeownership are rising, more high-income households 
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will switch to renting their primary form of shelter by using their savings and borrowing to 
finance their investment. This would be unproblematic if the market-clearing mechanism 
somehow enabled low-income renters to rent the surplus of new housing stock that remains 
unsold in such a situation, but unfortunately this is not how the housing sector works. The 
vacant lots remain vacant until the market picks up again and with the rising number of high-
income households who shift to renting, there is a relatively higher proportion of renters in the 
aggregate economy who can absorb higher rents and cause the displacement of low-income 
renter households who are more susceptible to rising rents and become ‘crowded out’ of a 
supply-constrained market.  
 
To visualize how such displacement occurs, let us consider the following scenario of an 
economy whose housing sector is in equilibrium (at time T=0) and then experiences a demand 
shock in the form a decrease in the short term nominal interest that spurs an increase in the 
demand for single family units at time T=1. 
 
Figure 19: Conceptual Framework of Mismatch between Housing and Homelessness 
Policy 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
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In the figure above the demand for total housing units is split into a demand for housing purely 
as capital goods for investment on the extreme left (these would typically be demanded by 
institutional investors who seek to sell or rent these units to other market participants (mainly 
households)) to households that demand housing both for shelter and investment in the middle 
(households who choose to own their primary source of shelter rather than to rent) and to 
households that demand housing purely as a form of shelter (households who have no choice but 
to rent given their constraints on affordability and access to credit) on the extreme right hand 
side.  
 
High-income/high-net-worth households that have a higher capacity to access mortgage lending 
by banks (facilitated by federal policy that creates market conditions favorable to homeowners) 
or have a higher level of savings/endowments that enable them to move freely between 
homeownership or renting their primary source of shelter, are represented on the left of the 
diagram. Lower-income/lower-net-worth households who possess a diminishing capacity to 
access mortgage finance and possess little or no savings/endowments and therefore cannot move 
freely between decisions to own or rent their primary source of shelter are represented on the 
right. The latter group must choose to rent if they are to remain sheltered and tend to be more 
susceptible to factors that impact the affordability gap as described earlier.  
 
Let us assume for simplicity’s sake that at T=0 that supply and demand for housing are in 
equilibrium and that the market for investment and shelter both clear. At T=1, due to a decrease 
in the nominal short-term interest rate and anticipated increases in the future prices of single 
family units, institutional investors and households that face lower income and borrowing 
restrictions begin to demand more single family units, the increase in demand is most quickly 
reflected on the left-most section of the demand spectrum which is highlighted in pink (within 
the sector of the economy that can make and execute investment decisions most flexibly due to 
macro policy that works in their favor).  
 
In the short term, households that initially demanded housing both for investment and as shelter 
and who are closer to the higher income end of the income distribution (closer to the left hand 
side than the right) can flexibly shift from owning just one unit to multiple units, and those 
closer to the middle may be able to shift from owning a smaller unit to a larger one (trading up). 
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A larger proportion of those households that have to rent may now demand more rental units 
instead of trading up or making home purchases as rents initially appear lower due to the drop in 
user cost at T=1 (this effect tends to be more dominant in urban areas where the value of 
housing is much higher than suburban areas, thereby making short-term adjustments from 
renting to homeownership difficult).  
 
When the economy begins to expand (and interest rates are low) better job prospects and rising 
incomes will cause average household size to drop and the number of households to expand 
putting upward pressure on the number of units demanded for shelter (rental) in highly 
urbanized areas. Of course the sticky short-run supply leads to a mismatch between those who 
can only consume housing for shelter (renters) even if they qualify for means-tested housing 
assistance (green section) and the total number of rental housing units available (vacant units for 
sale are excluded from the supply of housing renters have access to unless they are somehow 
made available to them for rent).  
 
What is surprising is that it is not households on the extreme right (the poorest households), who 
have access to physical housing units provided by the government (even if poorly maintained) 
in the form of physical public housing units (blue), that end up being displaced, but the low and 
extremely low-income households who are above them on the income distribution. The gap in 
supply needed to enable the market to reach equilibrium in time period T=1 is shown in gray; 
this is the portion of housing supply (mainly low-income housing) that falls into the 
disequilibrium gap; large institutional investors seeking to maximize their profits would not be 
willing to undertake investments that will not appreciate much in value or that cannot be 
afforded by low-income households due to their susceptibility to the affordability gap and this 
widens the supply gap. Similarly the decline in government expenditure on public housing will 
also tend to widen the gap in the supply of housing stock.  
 
Subsequently when economic expansion leads to higher inflation and tighter monetary policy, 
the increase in user cost makes investment in housing less profitable but, as seen earlier, rents 
and housing prices will be slow to adjust downwards even with a reduction in investment 
(supply) of new units. At the same time, the effects of high economic growth and high inflation 
would have led to rising unemployment (income shock), resulting in a further increase in the 
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demand for affordable rental units amongst low-income households (because of excessively 
high rents due to rising user costs), widening the gap between demand and supply even further. 
Ultimately those who cannot access the housing they need are those who will face worsening 
affordability issues in an already supply-restricted housing market; these households remain on 
the verge of being made homeless as a result of policy failure rather than personal 
circumstances. 
 
 
VI. WHO ARE THE IMMINENTLY HOMELESS? 
 
Dolbeare (1992) shows that the affordability gap is the principal underlying cause of 
homelessness in the 21 century. While homelessness is not a new phenomenon, by far, the 
studies associated with its analysis began in the 1980s in the United States, among social 
theorists, when homelessness first became a more conspicuous social phenomenon. These 
theorists discovered that the reason behind the increasing visibility of the homeless was the 
large-scale elimination of their existing sources of shelter: single row homes or skid row-type 
accommodation that were cleared to make way for urban revitalization and development 
programs. Prior to this era of urban revitalization most homeless individuals were capable of 
maintaining some form of employment and retaining some form of protective shelter, even if 
not under the most ideal of living conditions.  
 
The body of knowledge surrounding homelessness and our understanding of it does not extend 
far beyond empirical studies that estimate the size of the homeless population or descriptive 
studies of the demographic and personal characteristics of the homeless that includes their living 
conditions (Elliot and Krivo 1991). While the structural causes of homelessness can be 
attributed to high poverty rates, poor economic conditions and personal circumstances that are 
not supported by adequate mental health care facilities, it is the lack of affordable housing or 
more so the affordability gap that is often cited as the main cause for homelessness (Elliot and 
Krivo 1991; Dolbeare 1992; O’ Flaherty 2009 and [ICPH] 2015).  
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In the United States, HUD measures homelessness rates through administering its annual “Point 
in Time” (PIT) counts. These are simply headcount measures of the visibly homeless that enable 
HUD to keep track of their numbers according to certain demographics like age and family 
status. Reports on PIT counts have been issued annually since 2007 and form an important 
aspect of HUD’s Annual Homelessness Assessment Report to Congress (AHAR). 
Unfortunately, there is no examination of the causes or reasons for homelessness reflected in 
PIT counts. Nonetheless, this forms the closest record of the homeless that can be used to assess 
trends in homelessness rates/numbers. Figure 20 below shows the PIT counts of the total 
number of homeless in the United States between 2008 and 2017, divided into different 
categories identified by HUD.5 The chronically and unsheltered homeless constitute smaller 
proportions of the total number of homeless when compared to the sheltered homeless. It 
appears that those who are predisposed to imminent homelessness would fall within the 
category of either the sheltered or unsheltered homeless, depending on whether or not they 
qualify/have access to homeless shelter facilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 “Chronically Homeless Individual refers to an individual with a disability who has been continuously homeless 
for one year or more or has experienced at least four episodes of homelessness in the last three years where the 
combined length of time homeless in those occasions is at least 12 months. Sheltered Homelessness refers to people 
who are staying in emergency shelters, transitional housing programs, or safe havens. Unsheltered Homelessness 
refers to people whose primary nighttime location is a public or private place not designated for, or ordinarily used 
as, a regular sleeping accommodation for people (for example, the streets, vehicles, or parks).”  (Department of 
Housing and Urban Development 2017, 2) 
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Figure 20: Point in Time Counts (2008−17) 
 
Source: Department of Housing and Urban Development Point-in-Time (PIT) estimates (2007-2017) 
(https://www.hudexchange.info/resource/3031/pit-and-hic-data-since-2007/) 
 
The federal assistance provided to the homeless is captured in their homelessness inventory 
counts, the number beds at shelters and other units of supportive and temporary housing that 
ensure that the homeless are at least, for a limited time, not exposed to the detrimental effects of 
being openly homeless. Figure 21 below shows the total number of beds that can be accessed 
year-round at shelters, between 2010 and 2017. During this period we can observe that there are 
enough resources to cover the number of openly homeless individuals or households that are 
counted in PIT estimates, yet unsheltered homelessness tends to persist. The reason for this 
could most likely be a system of means testing within homelessness shelter programs that limits 
the access to such shelters to only a fraction of those who are openly homeless. 
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Figure 21: Trends in National Homelessness and Total Year-Round Beds at Shelters 
(2010−17) 
 
Source: Department of Housing and Urban Development Housing Inventory Count (HIC) data (2010-17) 
(https://www.hudexchange.info/resource/3031/pit-and-hic-data-since-2007/) 
 
 
Figure 22: Trends in Homelessness and Total Year-Round Beds at Shelters in New York 
State (2010−17) 
 
Source: Department of Housing and Urban Development Housing Inventory Count (HIC) data (2010-17) 
(https://www.hudexchange.info/resource/3031/pit-and-hic-data-since-2007/) 
 
Figure 22 above shows the number of year-round beds available and the total count of the 
homeless in the State of New York between 2010 and 2017. On average the number of beds in 
the state constitutes around 15 percent of the total number of year-round beds available, while 
the homeless in New York comprised on average 13 percent of the total homeless population 
within that time period. The ratio of the homeless count to total population estimates for each 
year between 2010 and 2017 as shown in each of the tables above, shows that New York 
experiences a higher rate of homelessness than the national average, indicating that 
homelessness is generally more prevalent there than across the rest of the country, even with 
sufficient shelter made available to the homeless at any point in time. In fact, in New York 
homelessness appears to be increasing while it appears to be declining at a national level since 
2010. Therefore even though the support offered through shelter-based programs is necessary in 
mitigating homelessness (Goodman, Messeri and O’ Flaherty 2016), it does so only to a certain 
Year
Total Year-Round Beds 
(Across All Programs)
Total Homeless Count
Bed/Homeless 
Count Ratio
Homeless 
Count/Annual 
Population Estimate 
Ratio
2010 661,230                             623,788 1.06 0.20%
2011 696,941                             623,788 1.12 0.20%
2012 703,313                             621,553 1.13 0.20%
2013 730,376                             590,364 1.24 0.19%
2014 772,788                             576,450 1.34 0.18%
2015 829,581                             564,708 1.47 0.18%
2016 867,102                             549,928 1.58 0.17%
2017 899,059                             553,742 1.62 0.17%
Year
Total Year-Round Beds 
(Across All Programs) NY
Total Homeless Count NY
Bed/Homeless 
Count Ratio
% of Total YR Beds
% of Total 
Homeless Count
% Change in 
Homeless Count 
from Prev. Year
Homeless 
Count/Annual 
Population 
Estimate Ratio 
(NY)
2010 99,355                               65,606                                1.51 15% 11% N/A 0.34%
2011 103,665                             63,445                                1.63 15% 10% -3.3% 0.32%
2012 99,492                               69,566                                1.43 14% 11% 9.6% 0.35%
2013 108,274                             77,430                                1.40 15% 13% 11.3% 0.39%
2014 114,667                             80,590                                1.42 15% 14% 4.1% 0.41%
2015 130,206                             88,250                                1.48 16% 16% 9.5% 0.45%
2016 130,049                             86,352                                1.51 15% 16% -2.2% 0.44%
2017 135,102                             89,503                                1.51 15% 16% 3.6% 0.45%
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extent and is not a sufficient solution to reduce homelessness in the long run, especially in areas 
like New York where homelessness has been a systemic problem for many decades. 
 
Homelessness measures and the programs in place to assist them are not structured with the 
purpose of proactively reducing their numbers in future. Had this been the aim, there would be 
more efforts undertaken to understand the nature of what precipitates homelessness, especially 
the economically related factors. This deficiency in policy and program structure directly 
impacts a subset of the homeless that are overlooked by academic research; the imminently 
homeless.  
 
“Near” or imminent homelessness is different from HUD’s definition of the sheltered homeless, 
which has a specific definition in HUD’s Annual Homelessness Assessment Reports (AHAR); 
the AHAR consistently refers to the ‘sheltered homeless’ as “people who are staying in 
emergency shelters, transitional housing programs, or safe havens” (Department of Housing and 
Urban Development 2017).  In January 2012, HUD published an independent two-page 
document that reviews the definitions of the constituents of homelessness and the associated 
record-keeping requirements in line with each. The memo identified individuals or families as 
“imminently at risk of homelessness” if:  
 
 “…the individual or family who will imminently lose their primary nighttime residence, 
provided that: (i) Residence will be lost within 14 days of the date of application for homeless 
assistance; (ii) No subsequent residence has been identified; and (iii) The individual or family 
lacks the resources or support networks needed to obtain other permanent housing (Department 
of Housing and Urban Development 2012).”  
 
The above requirements stipulate that there is some record of the number of imminently 
homeless that HUD generates but does not introduce in any of its publications. It can be 
surmised that the lack of data on the imminently homeless is impeding further academic 
research on this phenomenon. 
 
There are however a few examples of stand-alone surveys of aspects that relate to imminent 
homelessness. One feature of the imminently homeless is that they often ‘double up’ in an effort 
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to remain housed. Doubling up refers to the process of individuals or groups of individuals 
moving into or out of related or unrelated households. The 2013 American Housing Survey 
(AHS) included a national summary table that summarized statistical data from the survey for 
that year. It included a special supplemental report on the number of “Doubled Up Households 
— Movers Leaving and Entering Unit”− a record that has neither been included in their 
subsequent housing survey of 2015 nor included in the summary tables for the previous survey 
in 2011. Further details of the survey questions and responses presented in this report are 
included in the appendix. 
 
Another example of a more thorough one-off survey used to identify the type of shocks that are 
likely to precipitate homelessness is the 1992 report of the New York City Commission on 
Homelessness (O’ Flaherty 2009, 3). The survey is based on open-ended questions posed to the 
residents of city shelters. The response to one question is of particular importance here: “What 
would you say is the main reason you became homeless?” Out of 485 respondents from family 
shelters, 21 percent cited a lack of ability to pay rent as a primary reason for why they became 
homeless, housing being too crowded followed at 12 percent and a lack of employment was 
third at 9 percent. Among 487 respondents from single shelters, approximately 27 percent listed 
lack of employment as a primary reason for being made homeless, while 28 percent cited drugs 
and alcohol and 11 percent due to the inability to pay rent. The remaining reasons were welfare 
problems, illness/injury, jail/arrest, relocation, eviction, fire, unsafe housing and other social 
reasons had the response rates for these categories ranged between zero to nine percent for both 
single and family shelter respondents (O’ Flaherty 2009, 3). A similar survey is not known to 
have been subsequently produced, and which might serve as a better indicator of changes in 
factors that affect those who are imminently homeless, and the results of which might be useful 
in drafting remedial policies and programs targeting the long-term reduction of homelessness in 
the United States. 
 
How the Mismatch Between Federal Housing and Homelessness Programs Impacts the 
Imminently Homeless 
In chapter V we reviewed the possible implications of continuing to implement federal housing 
policies with a demand-side bias on an asymmetric housing market. The continual mismatch 
between the effective demand for and supply of housing is exacerbated under policies structured 
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to favor the demand for housing as an investment good, when in fact housing, whether bought 
or rented, primarily serves as a source of stable shelter. On one hand, housing policies omit the 
importance of housing as stable shelter, resulting in the failing of some people to access 
adequate and stable shelter from time to time, while on the other hand homelessness programs 
offer shelter with no guarantee of stability, generating a mismatch between policy objectives 
that should have concurrent objectives. 
 
The mismatch between these two policy sides is problematic in the long run; the weaknesses in 
federal housing policy contributing to the demand supply gap leads to a higher level of 
government spending on homelessness programs in the long run. This in itself appears to be 
counterintuitive to the aim of housing policy as espoused in the Housing Act of 1949, wherein 
access to adequate shelter is a promise made to every American irrespective of their 
representative level of household income or their preferences relating to the kind of housing 
they choose to dwell in.  
 
The most prominent examples of the failure of housing policy to meet its promise are associated 
with policies that were intended to ensure that low-income households received better access to 
adequate housing. The three different low-income housing programs that are critiqued in this 
section are: privately owned subsidized housing, low income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) 
backed housing, and Housing Choice Voucher programs. While each program is structured with 
different objectives, their implicit starting-point remains the same, to promote the growth of the 
housing sector.  
 
Privately owned subsidized housing programs emerged in the 60s and 70s in response to 
increasing criticism of public housing programs. They were established to serve households 
with incomes that were too high to qualify for public housing, but too low to afford housing 
within the private sector. Public- private partnerships would agree to construct or provide 
housing which was then offered at reduced rents to low-income households for a specified 
number of years in exchange for securing better-than-market rates of financing (thereby making 
it profitable for them to invest in the development of more affordable housing projects). Rental 
subsidies were incorporated only later into such programs; the initial approach to ensuring that 
low and moderate income households could participate in them was to limit construction costs 
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as much as possible (Collinson, Ellen and Ludwig 2015). While limiting costs makes sound 
investment sense, the lowering of construction costs, more often than not, requires the 
utilization of cheap quality materials. This implies that the quality of housing provided to low 
and moderate income households under such projects is likely to substandard and that housing 
units offered by the program may incur a higher level of future repair costs that may be passed 
on to participants of the program. 
 
Herein lies the problem of driving macro-dynamic growth using the housing sector; growth is 
stimulated within the construction and construction-related sectors, and as the targeted level of 
growth is achieved in these sectors; they will most likely be the first to face inflation. Thus 
construction costs, irrespective of whether they are associated with low-income housing projects 
or otherwise, tend to rise rapidly as the housing cycle moves upwards. Homes constructed 
towards the peak of the housing cycle tend to be relatively more expensive than those completed 
earlier on when costs were lower. The rise in costs necessitates the charging of higher rents on 
newer homes, thereby rendering rental subsidies under the program ineffective in reducing rents 
to an affordable level for participants, especially those who fall within the lower income 
brackets. This pricing out of low-income households replaces them with moderate-income 
households as the major consumers of privately owned subsidized housing. To ensure better 
affordability by low-income participants in the program, spending on federal rental subsidies 
had to increase. With time, spending levels on rental subsidies were deemed excessive and by 
1983, the program was cut back drastically and replaced with Low Income Housing Tax Credits 
(LIHTCs), under the Tax Reforms Act of 1986 and Housing Choice Voucher programs.  
 
LIHTC- backed housing is offered mostly on a flat-rent basis and is normally independent of a 
tenant’s income. Flat rents on LIHTC program housing cannot be set at a level higher than what 
is considered affordable according to a qualifying household’s maximum income. Thus 
developers can charge rent that is below this ceiling but may still be high in relation to the 
household’s income, causing some households to pay a much larger share of their income on 
rent than HUD’s 30 percent threshold for affordable housing. On the other hand, households 
living in LIHTC developments are not subject to scrutiny of changes in their incomes, implying 
that they are not required to move out even if their incomes rise to the point that their rent 
burdens fall well below 30 percent of income. In an environment where housing in general 
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remains in short supply, the use of flat-rents dampens the revenue generation prospects of 
LIHTC investors, which puts further downward pressure on the supply of affordable housing. 
The short supply of LIHTC housing is further worsened by units rented by household with 
increasing incomes not being vacated enough to accommodate newer households with lower 
incomes and higher rent burdens (Collinson, Ellen and Ludwig 2015 and Freeman 2002, 710). 
 
There are a variety of housing (rental assistance) programs, but all are based on the principle 
that tenants facing rents above 30 percent of their income can avail themselves of federal 
assistance that covers the difference, but only up to a specified maximum remuneration standard 
(Collinson, Ellen and Ludwig 2015). These standards stipulate that in the first year of the 
program, tenants should pay no more than 40 percent of their income on rent but that in 
subsequent years this threshold can increase. Housing Choice Voucher programs require an 
annual recertification of income of voucher holders and is means tested to ensure that support is 
offered only for housing units meeting a minimum quality and size standards. While Housing 
Choice Voucher programs now constitute the largest housing subsidy to low-income 
households, thereby highlighting their popularity as a federal initiative, such programs can only 
improve the affordability of housing where there is adequate supply. The only way in which the 
Housing Choice Voucher programs can be made more successful in their role of improving 
housing affordability is by increasing the supply of affordable housing, because the former has 
no use in the absence of the latter. 
 
It is clear now that the structures of some of the most prominent housing programs in use today 
have the potential to aggravate homelessness, when households that are not fully supported 
under such programs face rental or income shocks and become imminently homeless. Currently 
the homeless are collectively supported by federal homelessness programs only to the extent of 
mitigating their immediate need for shelter. Homelessness policies need to emphasize a more 
proactive approach towards the reduction of homelessness. The policy change accompanying 
such a proactive approach would require an understanding of why the homeless become 
homeless in the first place. An example pointed out in Goodman, Messeri and O’Flaherty’s 
2016 paper on the effectiveness of homelessness prevention programs in New York City is that 
of the ‘Homebase’ program that supports homeless families by helping them access homeless 
shelters. As, the program itself was only designed to help families overcome their ‘immediate 
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housing problem’ (Goodman, Messeri and O’Flaherty 2016) it misses out on the opportunity to 
understand what gets them into the shelter in the first place. Once the causal factors for 
homelessness are established they need to be differentiated into ones based on economic 
conditions and non-economic conditions, because the former is best suited to preventative 
measures while the latter is not. 
 
The shelter-based approach is still the best solution to counteracting the immediate effects of 
homelessness, thereby making it a relatively successful solution for the chronically homeless 
who are more often found to be so due to non-economic related conditions, such as substance 
abuse problems or mental health issues. Whereas homelessness caused by non-economic factors 
can only be mitigated, homelessness caused by economic conditions can be prevented by 
making better efforts to monitor and identify the imminently homeless (Goodman, Messeri and 
O’Flaherty 2016) and developing supportive policies that prevent the imminently homeless from 
becoming homeless. Local and federal housing and homeless policies must work together to 
ensure that homelessness arising from economic conditions is completely eliminated.  
 
What is an Alternative Approach? 
Scholars who attempt to study the links between welfare policies and homelessness generally 
follow a dual hypothesis: 1) countries with a lower level of poverty and inequality and larger 
welfare systems tend to have a lower level of homelessness than those with higher levels of 
poverty and inequality and smaller welfare systems, and 2) homelessness in countries with 
larger and more extensive welfare systems is more likely to be concentrated amongst individuals 
with ‘complex support’ needs (e.g., mental illness or substance abuse) rather than those with 
smaller and less extensive welfare systems where homelessness is more likely to occur as a 
result of poverty and housing affordability problems (Benjaminsen and Andrade, 2015). They 
posit that in a liberal welfare system such as that of the United States, a combination of high 
levels of both poverty and income inequality, a lack of social housing schemes, and a relatively 
weak welfare system all contribute to rising levels of homelessness represented more broadly by 
the poor population and those that are homeless due to non-economic personal conditions. They 
arrive at this conclusion by comparing the US welfare system with the social democratic welfare 
system of Denmark; a country which they point out has lower levels of poverty, a much larger 
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public housing sector and an extensive welfare system, where homelessness is precipitated more 
by noneconomic conditions rather than economic ones. 
 
The financialization of homeownership and housing rights was an ode to late neoliberalism, 
which when combined with the dismantling of housing welfare through the privatization of 
public housing initiatives, large-scale reductions in public housing investment and other welfare 
programs since the 80s in the US, turned housing into an investment asset rather than a human 
right (Rolnik 2013). The excessive commodification of housing, often abetted by government 
policies biased towards this outcome, has had disastrous effects in the recent past that are only 
likely to be worse in the event of future income and housing price shocks, and leaving those 
who are unable to exercise their right to shelter to become the most adversely impacted. 
Therefore it seems apt that the path to reformative housing policy should begin with addressing 
housing as a basic human right, that is, as a fundamental need rather than a want. The 
recognition of the right to adequate housing as a basic human right is increasingly being 
reflected in international law. The United Nations’ Committee on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESC) stipulates that: “…the rights to housing not be interpreted in a narrow or 
restrictive sense which equates it with, for example, the shelter provided by merely having a 
roof over one’s head or views shelter exclusively as a commodity. Rather it should be seen as 
the right to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity.” (Andrews et al. 2016, 2) Likewise 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts, “…everyone has the right to a standard of 
living adequate for health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care and necessary social services.” (Andrews et al. 2016, 3). These 
inclusions are founded on the basis that the inability to observe one’s right to access the bare 
minimum level of housing impedes the individual right to life, liberty and security of person 
(Andrews et al. 2016,7).  
 
The system of housing and homelessness related policies as examined thus far, attempts in 
various ways to provide housing to those most in need, especially families with children and 
veterans. However it is yet to integrate a fundamental principle of housing being a human right 
to its policy changes. In fact a true right to housing has never been recognized in federal housing 
policy at all, and as a result ‘discrimination in housing persists’ (Andrews et al. 2016, 13 and 
Byrne and Culhane, 2011). Future remedial measures in housing and homelessness prevention 
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policies must take into consideration the basic human right to housing; without it, the effects of 
economic uncertainty lead to untenable and stigma-generating outcomes for those affected, that 
inhibits them from living at their full social and economic potential (Byrne and Culhane 2011, 
381) 
 
The ‘Housing First’ model is an existing policy framework, which embodies the principle of 
access to housing as a basic human right. In the United States the Housing First model has 
gained recognition mostly through pioneering work conducted by ‘Pathways to Housing’. The 
Pathways to Housing website (Pathways Housing First 2018) identifies it as a non-profit agency 
established in 1992 that advocates for the direct provision of housing as a primary solution to 
homelessness amongst those who are mentally ill or have no alternative option for remaining 
permanently housed (Atherton and Nicholls, 2008). The key characteristics of the Housing First 
model include the offer of stable housing with no pre-conditions to be satisfied by those who 
avail themselves of its benefits, such as a commitment to sobriety. The offer of housing is 
accompanied by supplementary supportive care programs to help tenants who seek to improve 
their physical and social condition, but their acceptance is by no means enforced as a condition 
for retaining housing benefits; at no time are tenants under the threat of eviction because of their 
personal condition or circumstances and involves the direct combination of providing stable 
shelter without a means-tested approach.  
 
This stands in direct contrast with the Continuum of Care (CoC) approach followed by HUD’s 
homelessness-reduction policies and programs. The CoC approach works on a system of 
advancement from one step to the next by homeless individuals or families towards the 
achievement of stable housing. The CoC approach also enforces abstinence from socially and 
personally destructive behavior (Atherton and Nicholls 2008) as part of its requirements for 
accessing housing assistance. 
 
The exclusion of the need for pre-conditions to be satisfied under the Housing First model 
makes it an apt solution for mitigating homelessness amongst those with non-economic 
conditions, especially when it has proven to be a more economical solution to homelessness 
than the current shelter-based ones (Atherton and Nicholls 2008). The question that arises at this 
juncture, given the acceptance of housing as a basic human right, is whether or not this model of 
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homelessness reduction should be extended to cover those who are rendered homeless as a 
result of economic conditions related to the housing market as seen earlier. The explicit ‘social 
contract’ embodied in the promise of the 1949 Housing Act implies that this approach would not 
be misplaced; as specified in the Act there must be “a realization as soon as feasible of the goal 
of a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family” (Freeman 2011, 
709). While the offer of housing alone does not solve the problems leading to homelessness, the 
Housing First model would be an apt way to formulate a basis for government intervention in 
mitigating the supply-glut that ultimately contributes to homelessness. Expansion of the 
government’s public housing stock, through the construction of new units, conversion of 
government fixed assets to housing stock or acquisition of housing units from the private sector 
would collectively form the pool of housing for the economically disadvantaged who have no 
feasible options for housing left to choose from in the private sector, and thereby enabling the to 
exercise more equally the basic human right to housing.  
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Edith Elmer Wood was a housing reformer under the New Deal administration who advocated 
for adequate and affordable housing. Her 1934 paper titled: “ A Century of the Housing 
Problem” echoes the chronic nature of housing inadequacy in the United States and how it most 
severely impacts the poor. She posited that the housing problem in advanced capitalist societies 
is not a problem that can ‘solve itself’ in the manner that free-market neoclassical general 
equilibrium theory explains. Demand-side biased federal housing policies first introduced by the 
New Deal Administration, generated inefficiencies in a market with the pre-existing tendency to 
remain in disequilibrium, and this can lead to a temporary exclusion of some proportion of 
households in an economy from accessing housing that is adequate and affordable. Federal 
housing policies are structured in a manner that facilitate the commodification of housing and its 
conversion to an investment asset rather than a basic human right, while only providing support 
to households that participate in their housing assistance programs to enhance their ability to 
afford market rents and housing values, an approach that is not sufficiently effective to prevent 
their inability to obtain affordable housing when faced with rental or income shocks. The bias 
towards demand-side policies that are focused on homeownership remains a fundamental 
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feature of housing policy in the US, as policymakers often look upon the housing sector as a 
macro-stabilizer that requires only a conservative level of fiscal expenditure to function 
successfully. However under such policies the housing market generates price increases that 
tend to be ‘sticky’ in the downward direction, making affordable housing less accessible. Rental 
assistance through housing voucher schemes target the reduction of the rent burden on low-
income households, while tax credits under the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) 
program incentivize the investment in low-income housing through tax credits and cheaper 
financing, ultimately enabling more affordable housing to be produced for low-income 
households. However, the levels of government spending on rental assistance and other 
housing-assistance programs have been dwindling, while LIHTC has proven to be a not good 
enough incentive for investment in affordable housing. Housing policies focused on improving 
affordability in a supply-constrained housing market are ineffective in ensuring an equitable 
distribution of housing occurs across all households. The most efficient solution to ensuring that 
the effective demand for housing is met would be to increase government spending on the 
replacement and enhancement of public housing so as to increase the overall stock of affordable 
housing in the market, while acknowledging that out of the dual nature that housing serves as an 
investment good and as a necessity, its role as a source of shelter should be the primary focus of 
government housing policy. 
 
The repercussions of not addressing the supply glut in affordable housing include homelessness. 
For those who face bouts of temporary homelessness as a result of economic conditions, the 
policy system in place offers the same generic level of support afforded to the homeless in 
general, which is simply to meet their immediate need for shelter. Thus, those who become 
homeless as a result of their inability to afford stable shelter are offered only a palliative 
solution to a recurrent problem. An evolution in homelessness policy, from focusing on 
homelessness mitigation to homelessness prevention, needs to take place, with better methods 
and systems in place to monitor the economic conditions that become the precursor to imminent 
homelessness. Such a change in homelessness policy would help prevent the imminently 
homeless from moving into a state of transient homelessness. While the term transience implies 
that there is an eventual turnaround in the state of homelessness that such households encounter, 
often such disruption leads to economic losses in the form of higher welfare spending on 
homelessness programs. The ‘savings’ from cutting back on the investment in the national 
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public housing stock since the 1970s (Foscarinas, 1990) eventually will manifest as higher long-
term costs on the welfare spending needed to resolve an escalation of homelessness. One 
potential policy framework that future remedial housing and homelessness prevention policies 
can follow jointly is the Housing First approach, a model already in use as a non-means tested 
solution to homelessness reduction amongst those with mental illness or substance abuse 
problems. The same approach, in combination with an enhanced public housing stock, is 
suggested as a possible solution to ensure homelessness generated by economic conditions is 
reduced, until sufficient changes within homelessness policy measures are developed to monitor 
the factors contributing to imminent homelessness so as to prevent them from transitioning into 
a state of homelessness. 
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